北京の統一戦線工作と中国国民党(KMT)の罠 Beijing’s United Front and the KMT Trap

ダライ・ラマ法王の甥、ケドルプ・ソンドゥップ氏による分析

習近平によるKMT党首の国賓級接見は対話ではなく統一戦線工作である。野党を「正当な交渉相手」に仕立て、台湾の主権と民主主義を内側から切り崩す罠である。

北京の統一戦線工作と中国国民党(KMT)の罠

Beijing’s United Front and the KMT Trap

April 12, 2026

Published by Khedroob Thondup, the nephew of the Dalai Lama


エグゼクティブサマリー

• 習近平によるKMT党首・鄭麗文の接見は、対話ではなく統一戦線工作の一環であり、台湾の民主的な政治秩序を台北政府の頭越しに再構成しようとする意図がある

• 北京はKMTを台湾の「正当な」交渉相手として格上げすることで、選挙で選ばれた政府の権威を失墜させる古典的な手法を用いている

• 「民族の復興」「両岸一家」といった言説は無害な修辞ではなく、併合を既定路線として正常化するための言語的工作である

• KMTの内部分裂(実用的な交流派 vs. 関与に慎重な若手層)は、まさに統一戦線が利用しようとする亀裂である

• 台湾にとっての主なリスクは3点:①主権交渉可能とのイメージ付与、②KMTを「平和の保証人」に見せての選挙介入、③国際社会に対して台湾政府を「妨害者」に仕立てる情報工作

• 香港やその他の事例が示すとおり、統一戦線の帰結は常に自治の侵食・制度の空洞化・最終的な従属である

• 台湾と国際社会に求められる対応は明確:北京とKMTの会談を「対話」ではなく併合への合意製造工作と認識し、主権の不交渉性を法的・政治的・道義的に明示することである

Executive Summary

• Xi Jinping’s reception of KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun was not genuine dialogue but part of united front tactics, designed to reorganize Taiwan’s democratic political order over the head of the Taipei government.

• By elevating the KMT as Taiwan’s “legitimate” interlocutor, Beijing employs a classic maneuver to undermine the authority of the democratically elected government.

• Rhetoric such as “national rejuvenation” and “one family across the Strait” is not benign language—it is a discursive weapon that normalizes annexation as inevitable destiny.

• The KMT’s internal divisions—between pragmatic engagement advocates and younger members wary of entanglement—are precisely the fissures united front tactics seek to exploit.

• Three key risks for Taiwan: ① lending credibility to the image that sovereignty is negotiable, ② electoral interference by casting the KMT as the “guarantor of peace,” and ③ an information campaign to portray Taiwan’s government as “obstructionist” before the international community.

• As demonstrated by Hong Kong and other cases, united front strategies consistently produce the same outcome: erosion of autonomy, hollowing of institutions, and eventual subordination.

• For Taiwan and its international partners, the imperative is unambiguous: Beijing’s engagement with the KMT must be recognized not as dialogue but as a manufactured consent campaign for annexation—and Taiwan’s sovereignty must be affirmed as non-negotiable through legal, political, and moral clarity.


When Xi Jinping welcomed Kuomintang (KMT) chairwoman Cheng Li-wun to the Great Hall of the People, the optics were unmistakable: Beijing was not merely hosting a party leader from Taiwan, it was staging a performance of sovereignty. The encounter was less about dialogue than about manipulation—an exercise in united front tactics designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic consensus and reframe the island’s politics on Beijing’s terms.

The Mechanics of Manipulation. Symbolic Elevation: By granting Cheng the trappings of a head-of-state visit, Xi positioned the KMT as Taiwan’s “legitimate” interlocutor, bypassing the elected government in Taipei. This is a classic united front maneuver: elevate pliable actors to diminish the authority of democratic institutions.

Narrative Embedding: Xi’s invocation of “national rejuvenation” and “one family across the Strait” embeds Taiwan’s future within China’s nationalist project. Such rhetoric is not benign; it is a discursive weapon that normalizes annexation as destiny. Selective Engagement: Beijing’s choice to meet the KMT after years of frozen official dialogue underscores its strategy: reward opposition parties that echo its language, isolate those that resist.

The KMT’s historical orientation toward engagement with Beijing makes it vulnerable to co-optation. Internal divisions—between older elites who see cross-Strait ties as pragmatic and younger members wary of entanglement—are precisely the fissures united front tactics exploit. By offering prestige and access, Beijing incentivizes party leaders to align with its narrative, even at the cost of Taiwan’s sovereignty.

The Risks for Taiwan. Legitimacy Trap: Participation in such meetings risks validating Beijing’s claim that Taiwan’s sovereignty is negotiable. Electoral Manipulation: United front tactics aim to sway voters by portraying the KMT as the guarantor of peace, eroding support for pro-independence positions. International Messaging: Ahead of global summits, Beijing can present itself as conciliatory, while painting Taiwan’s government as obstructionist—a narrative that resonates with foreign capitals eager to avoid confrontation.

United front strategies are not new. From Hong Kong’s co-opted elites to overseas Chinese associations, Beijing has long deployed symbolic inclusion and material incentives to dilute resistance. In each case, the outcome has been the same: erosion of autonomy, hollowing of institutions, and eventual subordination. Taiwan’s democracy cannot afford to ignore this precedent.

For Taiwan, the challenge is to expose the manipulation and reaffirm sovereignty as non-negotiable. For international partners, the imperative is to recognize that Beijing’s engagement with the KMT is not dialogue but disinformation—an attempt to manufacture consent for annexation. The lesson is clear: united front tactics thrive on ambiguity. Only clarity—legal, political, and moral—can blunt their force.


Khedroob Thondup(ケドルプ・ソンドゥップ

Khedroob Thondup is the son of Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama. Educated at St. Stephens College Delhi University and the University of San Francisco. He was a personal assistant to the Dalai Lama and accompanied him on his first trip to the U.S.  in 1979.

He was sent by the Dalai Lama to Beijing from 1980 till 1993 for dialogue talks where he interacted with Xi Zhongxun and Hu Jintao. He has served as Member of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile for three terms and is the President of the Tibetan Refugee Self Help Centre Darjeeling since 1987. He has edited two books, Dalai Lama My Son and Tibet in Turmoil and presently lives in Taipei, Taiwan.

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