― 転向・治安維持・カウンター・インテリジェンスの視点から ―
発行：中東アジア情報戦略研究所
発行日：2026年8月17日
筆者：匿名（元大学教授）
An English translation is provided at the end of the Japanese text.
【注記】 本稿は、実務家・現場関係者による外部からのご寄稿（オピニオン）です。掲載内容は執筆者個人の見解であり、当研究所の見解を代表するものではありません。
エグゼクティブサマリー
- ゾルゲ事件を「過去のスパイ事件」ではなく、現代の国家情報機構の在り方を考えるための歴史的教訓として再評価する。
ゾルゲ事件は、単にリヒャルト・ゾルゲや尾崎秀実らによる諜報活動の事件として理解するだけでは不十分である。本事件を通じて明らかになるのは、当時の日本が海外からの思想的・政治的侵蝕に対して、どのような情報認識と対抗能力を有していたのかという問題である。国家情報局等の創設が議論される現在、ゾルゲ事件は日本のインテリジェンス体制の歴史的課題を再検証する重要な素材となる。 - 昭和期の治安維持体制は、海外からの思想的侵蝕に対して「反撃」よりも「転向」に重点を置いた。
特高警察や思想検事による取り締まりは、国内における共産主義思想の拡大を抑制することに重点が置かれた。しかし、その活動は、思想の発信源や国際的ネットワークそのものを把握し、これに対して積極的に対抗するカウンター・インテリジェンスの発想とは必ずしも結びつかなかった。この「内向き」の対応が、日本の情報戦略上の大きな限界を形成した可能性がある。 - 『共同研究 転向』は、昭和日本の知識人と転向現象を多面的に分析した重要な研究である一方、カウンター・インテリジェンスの視点には限界があった。
思想の科学研究会による『共同研究 転向』は、転向という現象を日本近代史の重要な問題として体系的に検討した画期的な研究であった。しかし、転向を生み出した国家側の心理や治安機構の構造、さらにコミンテルンなど海外の思想・情報ネットワークとの対抗関係については、十分に掘り下げられていない。本論は、この研究上の空白にカウンター・インテリジェンスの観点から光を当てる。 - 佐野学・鍋山貞親らの転向声明は、「敗北」や「屈服」としてのみ捉えるべきではなく、外来思想への対抗と日本の自主的な国家構想を考える上で再評価する必要がある。
転向声明を詳細に検討すると、そこには単純な思想的屈服とは異なる問題意識が存在する。コミンテルンの国際革命路線に対する距離、日本社会の現実への認識、さらに外部からの思想的侵蝕に対する反撃の可能性が含まれている。本論は、こうした転向者側の知的営為を、従来とは異なるカウンター・インテリジェンスの視点から捉え直す。 - 現代日本が国家情報局等の創設を進めるにあたっては、国内監視型の治安機構にとどまらず、国境を越えた情報戦・認知戦・カウンター・インテリジェンスに対応できる国家的能力が必要である。
ゾルゲ事件から得られる最大の教訓は、情報活動を単なる国内治安の問題として扱うのではなく、国際的な情報ネットワーク、思想戦、認知戦、諜報活動を一体的に把握する必要性にある。国家情報機構の創設に際しては、過去の治安維持体制の反省を踏まえつつ、民主主義と基本的人権を尊重しながら、海外からの情報・思想・影響工作に対して能動的に対応する能力を構築することが求められる。
キーワード
- ゾルゲ事件（Richard Sorge Incident）
- カウンター・インテリジェンス（Counterintelligence）
- 転向（思想転向）
- コミンテルン（Communist International）
- 国家情報機構・国家情報局
目次
第1章 反撃よりも転向に収斂される内向き
― 転向という非インテリジェンスな逆説 ―
1-1 特高という思想警察の陣容
1-2 日本民主化？の原点――ポツダム宣言から特高を見る
1-3 転向という行為は、権力による国民への「障害」である
1-4 思想の科学研究会の転向研究の瑕疵
1-5 転向を推進した特高の精神風景の探索がなぜ必要か
1-6 総括がされていない兆候がある
第1章総括
治安維持法が転向に収斂されていった心理学の果て
第2章 思想の科学研究会『共同研究 転向』について
― 転向という主題を多面的に研究したもの ―
2-1 『共同研究 転向』の刊行とその歴史的意義
2-2 鶴見俊輔による尾崎秀実の「偽装転向」論
2-3 尾崎秀実は変幻自在の近衛文麿の去就をどう読んだか
2-4 昭和天皇も転向の対象にした鶴見の知の不逞
第2章総括
『思想の科学』の転向研究の破綻の例証を提示する
第3章 反撃よりも転向に進む内向き指向の背景
― 転向研究の国際化が後退してしまった背景にあったもの？ ―
3-1 転向研究で見落とされている観点
3-2 カウンター・インテリジェンスに視野が及ばない
3-3 「転向」に文明開化という知の欧化優先の限界を見る
3-4 尾崎には転向を強いたが、ゾルゲにはできない限界
第3章暫定総括
消極的な反撃しかできなかった昭和の体制
第4章 昭和日本は、なぜコミンテルンの侵蝕に敗れたのか
― カウンター・インテリジェンスと転向の関係 ―
4-1 問題の整理の不徹底
4-2 コミンテルンの侵蝕への受け止め方
4-3 カウンターの働きは二つある
4-4 カウンターで積極策への取り組みに行かなかった理由
4-5 佐野学・鍋山貞親らの転向声明の波紋
4-6 カウンター・インテリジェンスの発想は国政にあったか
第4章暫定総括
中共党の侵蝕を傍観する癖の先例は、近代での消極対応にある
第１章 反撃よりも転向に収斂される内向き
― 転向という非インテリジェンスな逆説 ―
はじめに 特高という思想警察の陣容
日本が戦争に敗れた当時の特高警察の陣容は、1万人を超える態勢にあった。都道府県に単純に分散すると、200人以上になる。これだけのスタッフが国民の思想動向の調査をしていた。現在の公安警察の要員は倍以上になる。主題は、思想傾向を帯びた不穏な動静の調査と摘発である。逮捕権を持していた。ここでの主題である転向が位置していた制度環境である。
管理される側からすれば、警察力の行使は、観察対象にされただけであっても、明らかに威圧である。個人の思想の自由の侵害でもあった。国家権力としては、それだけ、モスクワ発の侵蝕という事態に危機感を抱いていた。その意味は、昭和国家の精神面での介入を意図した経営感覚である。
1 日本民主化？の原点、ポツダム宣言から特高を見る
降伏条件になったポツダム宣言では、この部分を日本近代の限界として執拗に批判した。その総括を経て、
「日本國政府ハ日本國國民ノ間ニ於ケル民主主義的傾向ノ復活強化ニ對スル一切ノ障礙ヲ除去スベシ言論、宗敎及思想ノ自由竝ニ基本的人權ノ尊重ハ確立セラルベシ」（外務省訳）。
占領下でも、この指摘に基づく変革は、「一定の方針」＊に従い、比較的に忠実に守られた、と見做していい。一般には、民主化と称せられた。
特高警察という存在は、この総括から「言論、宗教及思想ノ自由竝ニ基本的人権ノ尊重ハ確立セラルヘシ」の主力な障害になった。だから解散させられただけでなく、追放の対象になった。
＊以前にも引用した、降伏調印の際の米国務長官バーンズのNYT紙の記者への応対。
2 転向という行為は、権力による国民への「障害」である
転向という現象は、転向をさせた側、あるいは転向を期待し使嗾した側がいる。転向を思想弾圧の類型とした場合、加害者がいる。最初は特高警察であり、送検されると検察の思想検事になる。裁判になると、判事も加わる。「言論、宗教及思想ノ自由竝ニ基本的人権ノ尊重」に反する行為を展開していたわけだ。
合法性を纏っていたものの、その法制の由来を訊ねていくと、改訂は「緊急勅令」での制定であった。GHQ民政局の手下になったNHK（放送コード）や新聞（プレス・コード）は、監督側の提示するシナリオと文書に沿い、その「障害」を暴くのに傾注していた。米国の占領方針に沿った民主化に役立てようと＊。
しかし、降伏と占領以前では、特高は、海外からの思想侵蝕に対抗して摘発に従事していた。精神面での国土防衛の尖兵と自負していた。国民を知的障害から守っていたのだ。敗戦降伏以後は、価値の逆転をもたらした。
＊SWNCC（米国務省・陸海空軍調整委員会）のGHQへの多くの下達命令。中には、信教の自由を強調する余り、神社関係への不当な介入は、祝詞にも及んだ事例のあるという。
3 思想の科学研究会の転向研究の瑕疵
次項で扱う、思想の科学研究会の転向に関する共同研究には、不思議と、偏りがある。治安維持法に基づき、容疑者の持していた思想の破棄ないし転換を求めた側の動態と心理学には触れていない。特高係官には、拷問という物理手段も用いられた事実もある。権力行使の一環であった転向を強要した者たちの意識分析は、転向という現象を知るための有力な背景条件ではないのか。
元特高でこの研究に協力する者はいなかったであろう。しかし、欠席裁判でも、一つの主題として扱うべきであったと思う。折角の多元的な接近による共同研究としては、臥竜点精を欠いているではないか。そこに目線が働かなかったところに、この研究に内在する一面性があるように思う＊。
＊久野收はさすがである。「弾圧の方の事例も集められ、分析することができる」のをしなかったのに留意し惜しいと見て、強く指摘している。同下巻収録の「第四篇 討論 Ⅰ 日本思想史と転向（共同討議）」369頁。
4 転向を推進した特高の精神風景の探索がなぜ必要か
特高が対峙したのは、モスクワ発のコミンテルンによる侵蝕の摘発であった。治安維持法の主目的は、第一条に明記されている。そして、上述のように、特高警察は、占領下で消滅した。公安警察として別の形で再生したという見方もある。東西冷戦の激化にともなう、米占領軍の意志であった。内務官僚は、占領下でも自立性を確保するために継続を試みてもいた＊。
この継承の当事者の持していた統治する側の心理学が問題である。ポツダム宣言との関係に留意するからだ。法制の実際の運用において起きた、拷問による死者という事実の評価が問題として残されている。インテリジェンスとは真逆な取り調べでの権力行使であった。加害者は、戦後、口を拭って生き延びた。
モスクワを原産地にする海外からの知の侵蝕への対抗としての、法制に基づく彼らが持していた「知」（世界認識）の内容がどういうものであったのか。それへの包括的な研究は極めて少ない。無いに等しい。大部分は敗戦直前に焼却処分されたのであろう。ここにも、特高関係者の後ろめたさが露見している。
＊検察への扱いは微妙だったのは、日本降伏後から着実に、そして徐々に顕著になった米ソ東西対立から、米国の対日占領政策も、初期のポツダム宣言に記載された文面の解釈が徐々に変わってきたからである。冷戦たけなわの頃は、ソ連圏は旧ナチス、イタリア・ファシズムへの命名であった全体主義というカテゴリに入れられるようになっていた。
治安維持法の適用を職務とした思想検事は、特高のように排除される対象から、「反共」を鮮明にした米国側の意向（GHQ・GⅡ）で温存「再生？」されるようになった。だから、対日講和会議の直前における米議会非米活動委員会での、ゾルゲ事件に関する旧思想検事の証言という見せ場作りがあった。
5 総括がされていない兆候がある
2001年にNYでおきた9・11事件。威信を傷つけられた米国は、友好国への協力を求め、鎮圧への国際戦線を意図した。中国共産党の支配する当時の中国は、新疆ウイグル地区でのウイグルによる差別反対への取り締まりも、厚顔にも反テロの一環にした。
日本も米国の要請に応えて、協力した。その一端が、公安調査庁や警視庁公安部によりモスクへの信者の出入りを調査しているのが事件化して発覚した。訴訟になり、警視庁は敗けた。キリスト教国でテロ事件が起きたら、教会を調査対象にするのか。この過剰反応に見られる統治感覚と態度には、治安維持法当時の在り様と共有するものが活きているように感じる。
第1章総括
治安維持法が転向に収斂されていった心理学の果て
転向者を作り出すのに励むよりは、侵蝕の実態を把握し、原因の是正に着手することの方が重要ではなかったか。国益という観点から見ると、転向者の数を増やすのに重点をかけるよりは、思想が蔓延する環境の是正が優先事項ではないのか。それこそ、カウンター・インテリジェンスの任務ではないか。
こうした力点の偏重さは、ゾルゲ・尾崎等によるスパイ事件が発覚したものの、そこに視野が集中してしまったところにも作用している。一つの集団が活動していたら、別の集団もあるはずだ、に視線が働かない。インテリジェンスについての国際常識がゾルゲ事件では、全くと言っていいほど働かなかった。
ロシア革命という出来事は、地政学的にはユーラシア大陸とその近隣に多大な影響を与えた。昭和日本の受け止め方に見られる態様は、日本国家の広義のインテリジェンス能力の問題だけに終わらず、統治力の限界が端的に露見しているように思う。その象徴的な分野が、転向への特高と思想検事の過度の関心集中である。この力点の起き方にある不均衡さからは、出来事は過去の歴史ではなく、前掲のモスク監視の不当性についての裁判で敗れた事例のように、現実性をもって持続しているのがわかる。
第2章 思想の科学研究会『共同研究 転向』について
― 転向という主題を多面的に研究したもの ―
はじめに 問題の提起：転向という主題を多面的に研究したもの
昭和34（1959）年から37（1962）年にかけて、上中下3巻に分けて表題の書籍は刊行された。60年安保騒動を挟んでの発表であった。提示された内容は、日本社会を揺るがした出来事と、無縁ではなかった。安保問題は、「政治と市民」の季節としては、1952年の主権回復後、いわゆる戦後民主主義の市民による政治参加として初の大課題になったからだ。「転向」という昭和の悲劇は、安保騒動への非政党人の市民参加と無縁ではなかった。
主題としての転向は、従来は個人体験しかなく、しかもあまり愉快な記憶でもないので、研究として類書はなかった。「転向」の問題性を近代史の過程での現象として取り上げ、明らかにしようとした着眼点は、画期的であった。同研究会の主力であった境界人（marginal man）・鶴見俊輔の発意からであろう。資料性においては、鳥瞰を意図しているので、実に豊富である。
また、寄稿者の出来事への具体的な軌跡（ドキュメント）に力点を置いての記述も評価できる。それまで、大手を振っていた教条的なイデオロギー偏重の思想性（？）を極力排しようとしていたからだ。
その意図は、日本の近代という国家社会が有していた「思想」を巡る問題性での負の最大ともいえる現象を問題意識にしている。ここまで評価を記していながら、この共同研究に批判めいた言動をするのは、心苦しい。
鶴見は、幼少の頃からの在米経験が長いことによってか、対日認識で日本人の死生観の本質について実感できないようだ。当時の日本知識人には定本になっていたのか、ルース・ベネディクトの『菊と刀』（“The Chrysanthemum and the Sword”, 1946）の主題である「恥の文化の日本と罪の文化のクリスチャニティ」という構図と割り切りから抜けていない。鶴見には、恥を今生の世界だけに限定している浅さがあるからである（中巻。109頁）。
原日本人は、いずれ死んで向かう幽界から見られているのを本能的に知っている。欧化知識人はともかく、市井に生きる非知識人には、幽界の住人から振る舞いを見られている、という自覚が継続していた。だから、いずれは向かう幽界を意識して、今生で恥ずかしくない生き方をしなくてはならないのだ。
そうしたものの見方の不明のところが多く浅いところから、思想の科学ではなく「皮相の科学」だと揶揄もされでもいた。これは、痛烈な指摘である。
1 鶴見は、尾崎の転向を偽装と観ている
その理由や経緯は違うものの、鶴見による尾崎を偽装転向だという評価では、私見と同じである。この共同研究の主流は、多分、「権力と個人の信条の自由」という構図とその相克が、根底で根強く共有されていた。だから、尾崎の「転向」は、その典型になる。見方についての修辞は、さすがである。「偽装性を自分には明らかにし、他人には明らかにしない方法」の例の一つに挙げる。シナ風の言い方をすると、韜晦がどのように展開していたか、である。
「『順逆を誤る』ということについての尾崎の反省は、此の種の偽装転向の方法をとらなかったほうがよかったという反省ではなく、此の種の偽装転向の方法を自分が実地におこなった特殊形態についての反省だと思われる」（中巻、p110～111）。
この言い回しは一度読んだだけではわかりにくい。だが、筆者は、鶴見の見抜きに同意できた。しかし、囹圄の身の尾崎を囲んでいた検事や判事らには、見抜けなかったようだ。こうした双方の差は、置かれていた立場の決定的な違いによるものから来るのか。違うと思う。双方の知力、そして腹の括り方の覚悟の差である、と観た。その覚悟にある尾崎の「死して生きている姿」に、今生に生を偸（ぬす）む検事・判事は対応しきれなかったのだ。
そうとしたらだが、尾崎の死して生きている中で記述された二つの転向の意志表明とされている、上申書の紙背の凄みには敬服させられる。鶴見の前掲の技巧を活かした修辞は、一つの能力であろうか。
2 尾崎は、変幻自在の近衛文麿の去就をどう読んだか
鶴見は、近衛の昭和の敗戦末期の上奏文（後掲）を指して、「この上奏文ほど偽装をぬぎすて、近衛の真の意図を示した文章はない」とまで極言して評価？している＊。公卿の重層的な真意を隠す芸を見抜いている修辞である。
近衛の行き方というか生き方を、転向という観点から扱うのに、「偽装転向における偽装性を自分に対しても、他人に対しても、明らかにせず、それぞれの状況におけるムードと勘で動いてゆく方法」＊＊として捉えた。この観点は、「逆転を企画し、逆転に失敗した偽装転向である」（同上）と断定する。ここまで見切られ、それが事実としたら、近衛の立つ瀬は、今生にも来生にも無い。だからか、今世で浮かぶ瀬も無くなったから死を選んだ、で済ませるか。
＊前掲『共同研究 転向』中巻。106～7頁。
＊＊同111頁。
3 昭和天皇も転向の対象にした鶴見の知の不逞
上掲の近衛の振る舞いというか生き方というか、それとも行き方に限定する方がいいのかはさておいて、偽装転向と断定した在り様を、昭和天皇のお振る舞いまで対象にする。このあたりの物怖じしないために矩を越える鶴見の行き方が、後に、当時の総合誌であった中央公論に掲載された小説『風流夢譚』（1961）に発する殺人事件にまで起こる展開と間接的に関係してくる。
鶴見は、近衛の前掲の事例に事寄せて、「天皇の例は偽装転向によって非転向を温存しようとして失敗した例である」（同上）とする。この鶴見の断定は、例証が挙げられていないので、何をもってそう判断したのかが不明である。その言い分は、見方によっては、昭和天皇を近衛の振る舞いと同格に置いているように見受けられる。だから、不逞という表現を用いたのである。
第2章総括
『思想の科学』の転向研究の破綻の例証を提示する
尾崎の行き方というか死に方への転向問題を絡ませての評価は、鶴見の見識からと思う。だが、一方で、前掲のように、天皇と近衛の言動と振る舞いを同格に置いたところで破綻を見せる。昭和天皇の動静についての例証を挙げないで断定してしまっている。だから、不逞と敢えて明記した。なぜ、そうした断定ができるのか。鶴見は己の断定の根拠を挙げないが、筆者は例証を挙げる。
昭和天皇は、45年11月から12月にかけてのGHQによる矢継ぎ早の高圧的な指令から、何を意図しているかを識った。GHQとその周辺との意思疎通が図られて、いわば呉越同舟になる産物になった46年元旦の、GHQと追従する民主化派には『天皇の人間宣言』と名付けられた「新日本建設の詔書」が発布された。ここで、宸念として、冒頭に、明治元年の近代日本最初の国是としての『五箇条の御誓文』を掲げた。これで、占領下という制約での問題性は一件落着である。だが、鶴見の「知性」では、その内包している意味に全く気付かない。
皇位というお立場にあって、史上初の敗戦による占領下という一寸先は闇という状況での、ご宸襟はいかばかりであったか。しかし、近衛の迷走ぶりと挙句に自殺を選んだ逃げに比して、昭和天皇は微動だにしない姿勢を持していた。
GHQ民政局や彼らが推進した日本「民主化」に協調したいわゆる進歩的文化人の気分は、日本軍国主義と「天皇制」は不可分にあると信じていた。だから、そうした迷妄を打破しなくてはならない。それを『天皇の人間宣言』で理念化する必要があった。そうした思惑の果てを見据えた昭和天皇は、民主化の近代の雛形が五箇条の御誓文に集約されていると、占領下の国民に伝えたのだ＊。
鶴見には、そうした経緯を知ってか知らずか、昭和天皇の軌跡を失敗と断定できる勇気の持ち主である。この点では、皮相の科学と揶揄されても甘受しなければならない。
＊さらに、終戦後一年の1946年8月14日に、新旧の重臣を集めて茶会を開催された昭和天皇は、出席者に今次の敗戦を、663年の白村江の戦いでの惨たる敗戦とその後の再建の故事を参照にすべきではないかと問いかけている。『昭和天皇実録第十』173頁。
第3章 反撃よりも転向に進む内向き指向の背景
― 転向研究の国際化が後退してしまった背景にあったものとは？ ―
はじめに 転向研究の国際化が後退してしまった背景にあったものとは？
思想の科学研究会の画期的な成果である『共同研究 転向』は、比較を得意とする稀代の組織者・鶴見俊輔あって実現した知的な労作であった。敗戦後日本での近代史研究では、その広角で微に入り細に及ぶ作業は、画期的な成果になった。細部での批判はあっても、総体として批判する見地には立てようがない前人未踏の金字塔と言える。輪郭としては、この共同研究に匹敵する近代の日本人の精神史に関わる他の事業は、思い至らない。
しかし、その作業が成果を挙げれば挙げるだけ、そこに生じた視野の限界は覆い隠すことができなくなる。ここで言う「限界」は、国際社会との比較での戦後も含めた昭和という時代に内包する、知のひ弱さを物語っている。
党派性を脱してのインターデシプリナリー（学際的）な取り組みの画期性を発揮した参加者を評価するのは当然だ。が、同時に、限界を指摘せざるを得ないのが辛い。そして、この限界は、現在にいたるも指摘されていない。ということは、視野の限界が現在も克服されてもいないのを意味する。
それは、近現代日本での、単に「転向」現象への調査研究の限界だけでなく、国際社会に臨む日本の知識人の持していた限界が露呈しているのである。鶴見は、転向という概念を日本固有のものにするのを避けて、国際比較まで展開する思いを述べている。この発言をしたときには、彼なりの視野と展望を持してのものであった。ロシア革命の衝撃が世界、主に資本主義体制の欧米諸国に波及して起きたリアクションへの関心である。しかし、日を経るに従い、しぼんでしまった。なぜ、世界を呑んでいたかの知の野心が埋没してしまったのか。
東西冷戦という現実で、資金元になると見込んだ米国側からの協力を得るのが難しかったのではないか、と推察する。鶴見は、いわゆる60年安保騒動では、市民派の一人として、デモにも参加していた。国会周辺の警備に従事している警官が休息している場に赴き、所属する「声なき声の会」のビラを配布している姿の写真を、週刊誌で見たことを思い出した。米側からは、主題の扱い方で、容共性を帯びていると見られたのか。
1 問題の所在：転向研究で見落とされている観点
広範な転向研究は、戦前戦時の昭和時代における知識人の生態を知る上で、深く参考になる。既往で筆者は、此の種の現象を知るのに、後掲の『近衛上奏文』を重視した。さらに、それに匹敵する重要文献として、佐野学と鍋山貞親の連名になる「転向声明」（33.6）を取り上げた。この二つの文献は、私見によれば、戦前戦時の激動の昭和の精神史の断面を知る最も貴重な素材である。
転向は治安維持法を振りかざす官憲への屈服と見るか、新たな飛翔と見るか、その回答は昭和思想史の分野ではいまだに明快ではない。『共同研究 転向』の基調では、自ずと批判的なニュアンスにあるのを否定できない。そうしたスタンスからか、近衛上奏文にも偽装転向という見方を付している。近衛による、自分の役割というか存在はさておいての、天皇に向けた形をとっての、歴史に向けたエクスキューズのように見えたのは否定できない。
いずれの場合にも言えることがある。転向という概念というか理念型から事態を見ると、一つの可能性の想定が浮上しなくなる制約がある。転向への官憲の努力の傾注は、同時に、転向をもたらした思想体系へのボーダーレスな反撃の機会を策する意志の劣化を促進させていたのではないか。治安官憲は、国境を越えて上陸して侵蝕する思想に対して、防戦専一を特徴とした。彼らの知の世界に基づく戦略に、反撃と言う選択肢のあることに気づいていたか。
2 カウンター・インテリジェンスに視野が及ばない
嫌味な言い方をすると、特高警察の職分は、侵蝕している思想へのモグラたたきの作業である。治安維持を職分とするかぎり、彼らに国境を越えての反撃を求めるのは酷である。汚染された現象を極力消去する作業が、転向の強要になっている。カウンター・インテリジェンスには、視野が及ばない。だから、当事者の有力者であった初代特高部長であった安倍源基の回顧録には、ゾルゲ事件について一言も触れていない＊。
取り締まる現場では、非インテリジェンスな行為が起きることになる体質を内包していたのではないか。「反撃は最大の防御」には至らなかった。要するに、インテリジェンス（知）の及ぶ範囲は、相手がボーダーレスだから、こちらもボーダーレスで展開するには、至らなかったのである。
昭和期の治安維持法の運用での要にいた安部源基の1933年には、作家・小林多喜二ほか19名が取り調べで死んでいた。最多と言われている。「特高と拷問、そして死」という構図を作った。その負の成果についての扱い方は、昭和期の内務官僚の知にある職域倫理の限界を示唆している＊＊。
＊『昭和動乱の真相』原書房、1977年／中公文庫、2006年。
＊＊安倍の回顧録を読む限り、拷問死を反省している気配は薄い。取り調べに、法令を厳正に守ったと、拷問には触れない。中公文庫。148頁。こうした心境は、理解しにくい。
3 「転向」に文明開化という知の欧化優先の限界を見る
日本での近代国家形成の原点は、最初の国是、五箇条の御誓文の内容の実現にあるはずだった。しかし、既往で指摘したように、1928年に改訂されて国会の審議未了のまま、緊急勅令で施行されたのは、国体と私有財産制の並立の法文であった（第一条）。欧化に国体が汚染されたという見地は、当時も今も無い。ここに、欧化官僚の浅知恵が露呈している評価が大事である。日本に好ましくない思潮へのカウンター・インテリジェンスの見地からの取り組みは低い。専ら防御優先なのは、転向という作業への傾斜に露呈している。
4 尾崎には転向を強いたが、ゾルゲにはできない限界
受け身である限り、転向の強要しか対策は無くなる。そして、日本人である尾崎には転向を強いるが、ゾルゲにはできない。ここに、転向という対策をもたらした日本の官憲の限界が端的に出ていないか。近代日本の体制が外敵襲来に対峙した際の昭和の姿であった。だから、徳川時代の踏み絵を想起したのである。転びと転向の共有性を指摘した。尤も、転び伴天連をもたらした徳川体制の方が、ゾルゲへの強要をしなかった昭和と較べると、進んでいた？
第3章暫定総括
消極的な反撃しかできなかった昭和の体制
転向を強いる思想的な根拠は、文明日本に根差しているはずだった。尾崎は、知の発見を縷々記している。その限りにおいて、正直に記している。それを強いた日本の官憲のスタッフは、どこまで確信しての従事であったか。そうした疑問は、彼らが欧化の洗礼を受けての対処でしかなかったからである。そのつけ刃が露見したのは、敗戦後の占領期でのGHQによる系統だった認知・思想戦への反応を見ればいい。反撃は表面化せずに消滅してしまった？
戦前戦時に普及させられた「国体明徴」の二度にわたる国会決議を経ての日本礼賛は、伝来のように見えながら、欧化の変種でしかなかった？だから、占領下での民主化を名分にした日本改造プランは、あっけないくらいに受容された。マーク・ゲインの『日本日記』は、その狂態ぶり？の断面を赤裸々に紹介している。丸山真男は、「戦後民主主義の虚妄に賭ける」とのシニカルな表現で言ったものの、後世から観ると、虚妄の実態がますます顕著になっている？
大事な一点は、昭和の官憲には、転向という特異な処世を創出したものの、あくまでボーダー内の対処でしかなかった。ボーダーレスの思想戦略を打ち立てて反撃を開始する境地には至らなかった。カウンター・インテリジェンスの働きは無かった。ここに、漱石が予言した「上滑りに滑っていかねばならない開化」の限界を見出すのは易い。その癖は、思想の科学研究会の取り組んだ転向研究にも継承されているシニカルな現実がある。
その見極めを経ないと、国際競争力に堪え得る日本思想の再編成は不可能であろう。それへの気づきが足りない。気づくには、先ずは宿痾になっているかの欧化の沈溺から離脱することが求められている。
第4章 昭和日本は、なぜコミンテルンの侵蝕に敗れたのか
― カウンター・インテリジェンスと転向の関係 ―
はじめに 問題の整理の不徹底
これまで表題に関わる問題を扱いはした。従来は、転向問題をカウンター・インテリジェンスの領域から捉える意向は、さほど無かったと思う。インテリジェンス（知性）の問題として転向を扱う先例は、鶴見俊輔らの思想の科学研究会の取り組みしかなかったところからも窺える。だが、この取り組みは、米ソの対立が冷戦として展開している真っ只中での作業であった。彼らの転向研究は、そうした同時進行の環境上の制約から自由であったとは言えない。
従って、3巻の作業は、中途半端に終わったのは否めない。近代を構成し深刻な影響力をもたらした課題を明らかにする作業の重要性を意識すると、ここでの不徹底は惜しかった。グローバルな思想史研究としては未完に終わったからである。とくに、鶴見が意図した欧米世界での転向との比較研究は、文明としての双方の知の在り様を明らかにする突破口の有力な事例になるはずだった。
1 問題の提起：コミンテルンの侵蝕への受け止め方
すでに略述したように、日本の体制は、コミンテルンの侵蝕に対して、治安維持法を掲げて対抗した。1917年の露暦十月革命の五年後の22年には、日本支部が発足している。21年に上海のフランス租界で発足した中国支部に一年しか遅れていない。モスクワ側のシナ本土を優先した意味は、以後の展開を視野に入れると軽視できない。マルクスの資本主義論からすれば、日本経済と較べると遅れたシナ社会を優先するところに、帝国主義論の適用における戦略的な臨機応変を見出せるからだ。
日本での革命への予行活動は、当該の調査・研究書を当たられたい。学園紛争、労組結成と労働争議の頻発に、特高警察の緻密な取り組みが展開された。
最初の「成果」が6年後の28年の大検挙（三・一五事件）。次いで、翌年の四・一六事件である。この年、10月にNYウオール街での株式市場で暴落が始まり、やがて世界恐慌になった。米国市場に依存していた日本の絹の靴下や他の零細な雑貨は、消費の収縮により販路を失い、構造不況が常態化。労働争議の頻度もうなぎ上り。都市労働者の生活の困窮と高専、大学生、軍人を含む少壮知識人の左傾化は急速に進んだ。若手と中堅の軍人は国家革新運動にのめり込んだものの、自身を左傾とは全く思っていなかった。
特高警察は、この現実に、日本がコミンテルンの侵蝕により危機に陥っている、と確信していた。ただ、この確信の内容と対処の仕方が問題であった。カウンター・インテリジェンスに至り得ない限界が露呈していたからである。
2 カウンターの働きは二つある
事態の対処の仕方には二種類がある。積極と消極である。積極性とは、事態を受け身で受け止めるのではなく、仕掛けて来る相手への攻撃を視野に入れた考え方である。他方は、上陸してくる原因に対処することを重視する、要するに局所療法、消極的な対応である。特別高等警察は、国境外は管轄の外となる。流入してくる病患の摘発に重点を置いた。
既往で紹介した内務・拓務省のスタッフであった三田村武夫は、ボーダー外の日本の影響力のある満州や朝鮮半島へのコミンテルンの侵蝕に深く留意した。しかし、彼の憂慮は、特高警察には通じなかった。ここに、両者の問題意識の落差が露呈している。俗な比喩で言うなら、三田村は、元を叩かなければというのに、特高は、局所療法で対処しようとした。結果、拘置所に留置された三田村は、同じく未決として拘置されていた尾崎を遠くから視野に入れる機会をもった。ここには、近代日本の官憲が当該分野に取り組んだ際の、なんとも哀しく曰く言い難いイロニーの露呈した象徴的な現象がある。
3 カウンターで積極策への取り組みに行かなかった理由
では、なぜ日本の官憲は、治安維持法をもって上陸してくる不穏な革命指向の思想と運動に対処しようとしたのか。侵蝕してくる病患へのモグラたたきでは、作業は永遠に終わらない。相手が止めるまで禍根は消えないからである。つまり、事態の主導権は、発信元である海外にいる相手が握っている。
すると、最も集中するのは「転向」になる。共産党員あるいは嫌疑をかけられた者を自白させるのに、殴ったり蹴ったりの拷問が展開した。その選択を正当視した知の「限界」の生じた由来を明らかにする必要がある。
4 佐野学・鍋山貞親らの転向声明の波紋
1933年6月に起きた転向声明は、官憲の圧力に屈したとするのが戦後史でのほぼ定説である。特高の取り調べでは屈しなかった指導者である佐野、鍋山らの煩悶の生じたのは、特高から離れて検察に送られて思想検事の対象になってからであった。転向を迫る側との経緯がどういうものであったかの一端は、転向声明になる『共同被告同志に告ぐる書』に明らかである。
その読み方に幅が生じる。コミンテルンと1925年にスターリンが提示した一国社会主義論の距離は、転向の動機にかなりの影響をもたらした。その整合性を論理的に明らかにしようとすると、コミンテルン国際主義への距離が生じるからだ。佐野らは、文明日本を発見して、その視野は日本からの反撃の可能性にまで及んでいる。東アジアの各民族の連携による社会主義国家を想定している。その知力において、思想検事の視野・視圏を越えていたのを窺える。
転向したとしても41年まで獄中にあった。日本の法制は、転向は転向、治安維持法違反での判決は固守、であった。佐野、鍋山の転向を戦時日本に活かす積極性は全く無い。法治優先の消極的な対応なのだ。大東亜戦争という日本外を戦場とする非常時の現場に活かそうとする超法規的な視野は窺えない。ここにも、未曽有の国難に処する体制側の知の限界による硬直が露見している。
5 カウンター・インテリジェンスの発想は国政にあったか
転向問題への処理の仕方から見る限り、国憲を担う側にカウンター・インテリジェンスの見地を活かそうとしていたように見えない。受け身の消極性しか窺えないからだ。これは、The Westにより展開された衝撃の一つであるコミンテルンの世界革命路線を凌駕しようとする意志の欠乏としか読めない。
むしろ、変革への意志を持しておりながら転向した佐野や鍋山、その転向声明に同調した四ケタに及んだ既決・未決にいた面々は、外来のThe Westによる侵蝕への離別を明確にしつつ、ボーダーレスに変革を追求しようとしている。この意志内容では、思想検事の思惑を乗り越えていた、と評していい。
転向者である佐野や鍋山側は、治安維持法等の国憲を背景にしていた特高や思想検事らの視圏を遥かに超えている。反撃の意欲ある知の武装を意図していたのは、転向声明にある生硬ではあっても論旨の展開の仕方に露顕している。後世の日本人は、あの圧力を受けて獄中にありながら、こうした見識を活かして公然と表明されていた日本人の居たことを誇っていいと思う＊。
＊そうした意味では、佐野らの転向を扱った高畠通敏『一国社会主義者――佐野学・鍋山貞親』（前掲『共同研究 転向』上に収録）は、「裏切りの視点」から抜け出ていない。
第4章暫定総括
中共党の侵蝕を傍観する癖の先例は、近代での消極対応にある
すると、現在の状況を意識しつつ積極的な反撃を展開しえない弱点の原初は、すでに近代史での国憲の態度にあった、と観る。この分野での史実の在り様を軽視できない。生理動作は、意識し相対化しないと繰り返すからである。
佐野、鍋山の転向声明を読む限り、そこには、コミンテルンの侵蝕に対峙したカウンター・インテリジェンスの構想が明示されている。The Westによる文明衝撃への切実な反撃の萌芽を読み取れる。こうした貴重な史実を有しているのを視野に入れて学ぶ姿勢のある限り、中共党の演出する歴史戦の侵蝕を怖れる必要は全くない。
【注記（再掲）】 本稿は、実務家・現場関係者による外部からのご寄稿（オピニオン）です。掲載内容は執筆者個人の見解であり、当研究所の見解を代表するものではありません。
English edition
Rethinking the Sorge Incident in an Era of Establishing a National Intelligence Organization
— From the Perspectives of Ideological Conversion, Public Security, and Counterintelligence —
Contributed Essay
Author: Anonymous
[Editor’s Note] This article is an external contribution (opinion piece) submitted by a practitioner with relevant field experience. The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of this institute.
Executive Summary
1. Reassessing the Sorge Incident not as a “spy case of the past,” but as a historical lesson for considering the future of national intelligence organizations
It is insufficient to understand the Sorge Incident simply as an espionage case involving Richard Sorge, Hidemi Ozaki, and others. What the incident reveals is the question of what kind of intelligence awareness and countermeasures Japan possessed in response to ideological and political infiltration from abroad at the time. As the establishment of a national intelligence organization and related institutions is being discussed today, the Sorge Incident provides an important historical case through which to reexamine the longstanding challenges facing Japan’s intelligence system.
2. The public security system of the Showa era placed greater emphasis on “ideological conversion” than on “counterattack” against ideological infiltration from abroad
The activities of the Special Higher Police and prosecutors specializing in thought crimes focused primarily on suppressing the spread of communist ideology within Japan. However, these activities were not necessarily connected to a counterintelligence approach aimed at identifying the sources of such ideologies and their international networks and actively countering them. This inward-looking approach may have constituted a major limitation in Japan’s intelligence strategy.
3. Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion was an important study that examined the phenomenon of ideological conversion among Japanese intellectuals during the Showa era from multiple perspectives, but it had limitations in terms of counterintelligence
The Society for the Study of Thought’s Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion was a groundbreaking study that systematically examined ideological conversion as an important issue in modern Japanese history. However, it did not sufficiently explore the psychology of the state and the structure of its public security apparatus that produced such conversions, nor did it delve deeply into the confrontation between Japan and overseas ideological and intelligence networks such as the Comintern. This paper sheds new light on this gap in previous research from the perspective of counterintelligence.
4. The ideological conversion statements of Manabu Sano, Sadachika Nabeyama, and others should not be viewed solely as acts of “defeat” or “submission,” but should be reassessed in considering resistance to foreign ideologies and an independent vision for Japan as a nation
A detailed examination of these ideological conversion statements reveals a set of concerns that cannot be reduced to simple ideological submission. They include a distance from the Comintern’s international revolutionary line, an awareness of the realities of Japanese society, and the possibility of countering ideological infiltration from abroad. This paper examines the intellectual efforts of those who underwent ideological conversion from a counterintelligence perspective that differs from conventional interpretations.
5. As contemporary Japan moves toward establishing a national intelligence organization and related institutions, it requires national capabilities that extend beyond domestic surveillance-oriented security institutions to address transnational information warfare, cognitive warfare, and counterintelligence
The greatest lesson to be drawn from the Sorge Incident is the need to understand intelligence activities not merely as a matter of domestic security, but as an integrated field encompassing international intelligence networks, ideological warfare, cognitive warfare, and espionage. In establishing a national intelligence organization, Japan must learn from the shortcomings of its past public security system while respecting democracy and fundamental human rights, and develop the capability to respond proactively to information operations, ideological influence, and influence activities originating from abroad.
Keywords
- The Sorge Incident (Richard Sorge Incident)
- Counterintelligence
- Ideological Conversion
- Comintern (Communist International)
- National Intelligence Organization / National Intelligence Agency
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 An Inward-Looking System That Converged on Ideological Conversion Rather Than Counterattack
— The Paradox of an “Unintelligence” Approach to Ideological Conversion —
1-1 The Structure of the Special Higher Police as a Thought Police Force
1-2 The Origins of Japan’s Democratization? — Examining the Special Higher Police through the Potsdam Declaration
1-3 Ideological Conversion as an “Obstacle” Imposed on the People by State Power
1-4 The Shortcomings of the Society for the Study of Thought’s Research on Ideological Conversion
1-5 Why It Is Necessary to Explore the Mental Landscape of the Special Higher Police That Promoted Ideological Conversion
1-6 Signs That a Comprehensive Reckoning Has Yet to Be Made
Chapter 1 Summary
The Psychological Consequences of the Maintenance of Public Security Law Converging on Ideological Conversion
Chapter 2 On the Society for the Study of Thought’s Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion
— A Multifaceted Study of Ideological Conversion as a Historical Theme —
2-1 The Publication of Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion and Its Historical Significance
2-2 Shunsuke Tsurumi’s Theory of Hidemi Ozaki’s “Feigning Ideological Conversion”
2-3 How Did Hidemi Ozaki Interpret the Shifting Political Position of Fumimaro Konoe?
2-4 The Intellectual Defiance of Shunsuke Tsurumi, Who Also Made Emperor Showa a Subject of Ideological Conversion
Chapter 2 Summary
Presenting Evidence of the Collapse of the Shiso no Kagaku Research on Ideological Conversion
Chapter 3 The Background to Japan’s Inward-Looking Orientation toward Ideological Conversion Rather Than Counterattack
— What Lay Behind the Retreat from the Internationalization of Research on Ideological Conversion? —
3-1 Perspectives Overlooked in Research on Ideological Conversion
3-2 The Failure to Extend the Perspective to Counterintelligence
3-3 The Limits of the Intellectual Preference for Westernization under the Banner of “Civilization and Enlightenment” as Seen in “Ideological Conversion”
3-4 The Limitations of Forcing Ozaki to Convert While Being Unable to Do the Same to Sorge
Provisional Chapter 3 Summary
The Showa Regime’s Inability to Mount Anything More Than a Passive Counterattack
Chapter 4 Why Did Showa-Era Japan Lose the Struggle Against Comintern Infiltration?
— The Relationship Between Counterintelligence and Ideological Conversion —
4-1 The Incomplete Organization of the Problem
4-2 Japan’s Response to Comintern Infiltration
4-3 There Are Two Functions of Counteraction
4-4 Why Japan Failed to Pursue an Active Counterstrategy
4-5 The Repercussions of the Ideological Conversion Statement by Manabu Sano, Sadachika Nabeyama, and Others
4-6 Was There a Counterintelligence Perspective in National Governance?
Provisional Chapter 4 Summary
The Precedent for the Habit of Looking on Passively as the Chinese Communist Party Expands Its Influence Lies in the Passive Responses of Modern Japan
Chapter 1 An Inward-Looking Orientation That Converged on Ideological Conversion Rather Than Counterattack
— The Paradox of an “Unintelligence” Approach to Ideological Conversion —
Introduction The Structure of the Special Higher Police as a Thought Police Force
At the time Japan was defeated in the war, the Special Higher Police (Tokkō Keisatsu) had a nationwide organization of more than 10,000 personnel. If this force were simply distributed among the prefectures, there would have been more than 200 personnel per prefecture. This was the scale of the staff engaged in investigating the ideological trends of the Japanese population. Today, the number of personnel in the Public Security Police is more than twice that figure. Their principal mission was to investigate and crack down on suspicious activities that displayed ideological tendencies. They possessed the authority to make arrests. This was the institutional environment in which the issue of “ideological conversion,” the central theme of this chapter, was situated.
From the perspective of those subject to such control, the exercise of police power was clearly intimidating, even when an individual was merely placed under observation. It also constituted an infringement upon freedom of thought. From the perspective of state power, this demonstrated the extent to which the authorities felt a sense of crisis regarding ideological infiltration originating in Moscow. In this sense, it reflected an administrative mentality that sought to intervene in the spiritual and ideological sphere of the Showa state.
1 The Origins of Japan’s Democratization? Examining the Special Higher Police through the Potsdam Declaration
The Potsdam Declaration, which established the conditions for Japan’s surrender, repeatedly criticized this aspect as a fundamental limitation of modern Japan. Following this reckoning, it stated:
“The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the people of Japan. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.”
(Translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)
Even under the Occupation, it may be considered that the reforms based on this principle were implemented relatively faithfully in accordance with “certain policies”＊. In general, these reforms came to be referred to as democratization.
From this perspective, the very existence of the Special Higher Police became a major obstacle to the principle that “freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for fundamental human rights, shall be established.” This was why the organization was not only dissolved but also became subject to purges.
＊Previously cited: the response of U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to a New York Times reporter at the time of the signing of the surrender.
2 Ideological Conversion as an “Obstacle” Imposed on the People by State Power
The phenomenon of ideological conversion necessarily involved those who compelled, expected, or incited others to convert. If ideological conversion is regarded as a form of ideological repression, then there were perpetrators. Initially, these were members of the Special Higher Police. Once cases were referred for prosecution, prosecutors specializing in thought crimes became involved. When cases proceeded to trial, judges also became part of the process. In other words, actions contrary to the principle that “freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for fundamental human rights, shall be established” were being carried out.
Although these actions were cloaked in legality, when one traces the origins of the relevant legal system, one finds that its revision had been enacted through an “Emergency Imperial Ordinance.” NHK, which had become subordinate to the GHQ Civil Affairs Section through its broadcasting code, and the newspapers, operating under the Press Code, devoted themselves to exposing these “obstacles” in accordance with the scenarios and documents presented by those overseeing them,＊ with the aim of contributing to democratization in line with U.S. occupation policy.
However, before Japan’s surrender and occupation, the Special Higher Police had been engaged in detecting and suppressing ideological infiltration originating from abroad. They regarded themselves as the vanguard of the defense of the national territory in the spiritual and ideological sphere. In their own view, they were protecting the Japanese people from intellectual impairment. Following defeat and surrender, however, this value system was reversed.
＊Numerous directives were issued to GHQ by the SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee). In some cases, the emphasis on freedom of religion was so strong that inappropriate intervention in matters concerning Shinto shrines reportedly extended even to the recitation of norito (Shinto ritual prayers).
3 The Shortcomings of the Society for the Study of Thought’s Research on Ideological Conversion
The collaborative research on ideological conversion conducted by the Society for the Study of Thought, which will be examined in the following section, contains a curious imbalance. It does not address the conduct or psychology of those who, under the Maintenance of Public Security Law, demanded that suspects abandon or transform the ideological beliefs they held. There were also cases in which Special Higher Police officers used physical means, including torture. Was not an analysis of the consciousness of those who compelled ideological conversion as an exercise of state power an essential background condition for understanding the phenomenon of ideological conversion?
It is unlikely that any former Special Higher Police officers would have cooperated with this research. Nevertheless, even in their absence, the subject should have been addressed as an independent theme. As a collaborative study that sought a multifaceted approach, does it not lack the final element necessary to bring the entire picture into focus? The fact that this perspective was not brought into consideration appears to reveal a certain one-sidedness inherent in the research itself＊.
＊Kunio Kuno was, as expected, perceptive on this point. He strongly noted and regretted the fact that “cases involving the side responsible for repression could also have been collected and analyzed,” but were not. See “Part IV: Discussion, I. The History of Japanese Thought and Ideological Conversion (Joint Discussion),” Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion, Vol. 2, p. 369.
4 Why Is It Necessary to Explore the Mental Landscape of the Special Higher Police That Promoted Ideological Conversion?
The Special Higher Police confronted and sought to detect the infiltration of the Comintern originating in Moscow. The primary purpose of the Maintenance of Public Security Law was explicitly stated in Article 1. As noted above, the Special Higher Police disappeared under the Occupation. There is also a view that it was later revived in another form as the Public Security Police. This was consistent with the intentions of the U.S. occupation forces as the Cold War between East and West intensified. Bureaucrats of the Home Ministry had also attempted to maintain continuity in order to preserve a degree of institutional autonomy even under the Occupation＊.
The psychology of those on the governing side who were involved in this institutional succession is an important issue. This is because it is necessary to consider the relationship between their actions and the Potsdam Declaration. The fact that deaths occurred as a result of torture in the actual implementation of the legal system remains an unresolved issue requiring evaluation. This was an exercise of state power in interrogation that was the exact opposite of intelligence. The perpetrators survived after the war without publicly confronting or acknowledging their responsibility.
As a means of countering the intellectual infiltration originating overseas from Moscow, what was the content of the “knowledge”—that is, their worldview—possessed by those who acted under the legal system? There has been remarkably little comprehensive research on this question. Indeed, there is almost none. Much of the relevant material was presumably destroyed by fire immediately before the end of the war. Here too, one can discern the lingering sense of guilt among those connected with the Special Higher Police.
＊The treatment of the prosecution authorities was a delicate matter. Following Japan’s surrender, the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union gradually became more pronounced, and U.S. occupation policy toward Japan also gradually changed in its interpretation of the language contained in the original Potsdam Declaration. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet bloc came to be categorized under the term “totalitarianism,” a label that had previously been applied to Nazi Germany and Italian Fascism.
Prosecutors specializing in thought crimes, whose official duty had been to enforce the Maintenance of Public Security Law, were gradually preserved and “revived?” under the anti-communist policy of the United States (GHQ and G-2), rather than being treated as targets for removal like the Special Higher Police. This explains the staging of testimony by a former thought prosecutor concerning the Sorge Incident before the U.S. House Committee on Un-American Activities shortly before the San Francisco Peace Conference.
5 Signs That a Comprehensive Reckoning Has Yet to Be Made
The September 11 attacks of 2001 in New York profoundly damaged the prestige of the United States. The United States called upon its allies to cooperate and sought to establish an international front for suppressing terrorism. At the time, the Chinese Communist Party-controlled government in China shamelessly incorporated its crackdown on opposition to discrimination against the Uyghur people in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region into the broader framework of the fight against terrorism.
Japan also responded to the U.S. request for cooperation. One aspect of this became publicly known when it was revealed that the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Public Security Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department had been investigating the movements of worshippers entering and leaving mosques. The matter resulted in litigation, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department lost the case.
If a terrorist incident were to occur in a Christian country, would churches be placed under investigation? The governing mentality and attitude revealed by such an excessive reaction appear to share characteristics with the approach that existed during the era of the Maintenance of Public Security Law.
Chapter 1 Summary
The Psychological Consequences of the Maintenance of Public Security Law Converging on Ideological Conversion
Rather than devoting efforts to producing ideological converts, would it not have been more important to understand the actual nature of the infiltration and begin correcting its underlying causes? From the perspective of national interest, should not priority have been given to correcting the environment in which an ideology was spreading, rather than focusing on increasing the number of ideological converts? Is this not precisely the task of counterintelligence?
This imbalance in priorities also affected the response to the espionage case involving Sorge, Ozaki, and others. Although the spy network was uncovered, attention became excessively concentrated on that single case. The possibility that if one group was operating, another group might also exist was not considered. In the Sorge Incident, international common sense regarding intelligence was almost entirely absent.
The Russian Revolution had an enormous geopolitical impact on the Eurasian continent and its surrounding regions. The way Showa-era Japan responded to this development appears to reveal not merely a problem with the Japanese state’s broad intelligence capabilities, but also the fundamental limits of its governing capacity. One symbolic manifestation of this was the excessive concentration of attention by the Special Higher Police and thought prosecutors on ideological conversion.
The imbalance reflected in this distribution of priorities demonstrates that these issues have not remained merely matters of the past. They continue to have contemporary relevance, as illustrated by the case in which the authorities lost a court battle over the unjustified surveillance of a mosque.
Chapter 2 On the Society for the Study of Thought’s Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion
— A Multifaceted Study of Ideological Conversion as a Historical Theme —
Introduction Posing the Question: A Multifaceted Study of Ideological Conversion as a Historical Theme
From 1959 (Showa 34) through 1962 (Showa 37), the book referred to by the title above was published in three volumes: the upper, middle, and lower volumes. Its publication took place around the time of the 1960 Anpo protests. The content presented in the work was not unrelated to events that shook Japanese society. The security treaty issue became the first major political challenge, following the restoration of Japan’s sovereignty in 1952, in which ordinary citizens participated in politics as part of what came to be known as postwar democracy. The “tragedy of ideological conversion” in the Showa era was not unrelated to the participation of non-partisan citizens in the Anpo protests.
As a subject of study, ideological conversion had previously been understood largely through individual experiences, and because these were generally not pleasant memories, there had been no comparable scholarly work. The decision to take the problem of “ideological conversion” as a phenomenon in the historical process of modern Japan and to clarify its significance was groundbreaking. This initiative presumably originated with Shunsuke Tsurumi, a “marginal man” and one of the central figures of the Society for the Study of Thought. In terms of source material, the study is remarkably rich, as it seeks to provide a bird’s-eye view of the subject.
The descriptions also deserve recognition for placing emphasis on the concrete trajectories—the documentary records—of the contributors’ experiences. Until then, every effort had been made to eliminate, as far as possible, the doctrinaire ideological bias that had previously dominated intellectual discourse.
The underlying intention was to confront what may be regarded as one of the most negative manifestations of the problems surrounding “thought” within the modern Japanese nation-state and society. Having expressed such an assessment, I nevertheless feel some reluctance in making critical observations about this collaborative study.
Perhaps because Tsurumi spent a considerable part of his childhood in the United States, he seems unable to fully grasp, in his understanding of Japan, the essence of the Japanese people’s view of life and death. He appears not to have escaped the framework established by Ruth Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), which had become something of a standard reference among Japanese intellectuals of the time: the distinction between Japan as a “shame culture” and Christianity as a “guilt culture.” This is because Tsurumi’s understanding of shame is shallow, in that he confines it solely to the world of this present life (Middle Volume, p. 109).
The original Japanese people instinctively understood that they were being watched from the spirit world to which they would eventually depart after death. Leaving aside Westernized intellectuals, ordinary non-intellectual people living their daily lives retained an awareness that their conduct was being observed by inhabitants of the spirit world. Therefore, conscious of the spirit world to which they would eventually journey, they had to live in this present world in a manner that would not bring shame upon themselves.
Because of the many areas in which such perspectives were misunderstood or treated superficially, the Society for the Study of Thought was sometimes derisively referred to as a “science of superficiality” rather than a “science of thought.” This is devastating criticism.
1 Tsurumi Regards Ozaki’s Ideological Conversion as Feigned
Although the reasons and circumstances differ, I share Tsurumi’s assessment that Hhidemi Ozaki’s ideological conversion was a form of feigned conversion. The dominant framework underlying this collaborative study was probably the deeply shared conception of “power versus the individual’s freedom of conscience” and the conflict between the two. For this reason, Ozaki’s “conversion” became a classic example.
Tsurumi’s rhetorical formulation of this perspective is, indeed, skillful. He cites it as one example of “a method by which the feigned nature of the conversion is made clear to oneself but not to others.” To put it in a Chinese-style expression, the question is how taohui —the art of concealing one’s true intentions—was deployed.
“Ozaki’s reflection on ‘mistaking the right and the wrong’ does not appear to mean that he regretted failing to adopt this method of feigned conversion. Rather, it appears to be a reflection on the form in which he himself actually practiced this method of feigned conversion.”
(Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion, Middle Volume, pp. 110–111)
This wording is difficult to understand after reading it only once. Nevertheless, I agree with Tsurumi’s insight. However, it appears that the prosecutors and judges who surrounded Ozaki while he was imprisoned were unable to see through it. Does this difference between the two sides arise from the decisive difference in their respective positions? I do not think so. I believe it arose from the difference in their intellectual capacities and, above all, from the difference in their resolve to face the consequences of their choices.
The prosecutors and judges, who were merely stealing away their lives in this present world, were unable to respond to the “state of being alive through death” embodied by Ozaki in his determination.
If this interpretation is correct, then one cannot help but admire the extraordinary force contained in the reverse side of the pages of the petition in which Ozaki, living through death, expressed what are regarded as two declarations of his intention regarding ideological conversion. The rhetorical technique displayed in Tsurumi’s formulation may itself be considered a particular intellectual ability.
2 How Did Ozaki Interpret the Shifting Political Position of Fumimaro Konoe?
Referring to the memorial submitted by Fumimaro Konoe toward the end of the Showa-era war and defeat (discussed below), Tsurumi goes so far as to state that “there is no other document in which Konoe so completely removed his disguise and revealed his true intentions.” ＊ This is a rhetorical expression that sees through the aristocratic art of concealing one’s layered and complex true intentions.
Tsurumi approaches Konoe’s way of conducting his political life—or his way of living—from the perspective of ideological conversion, describing it as “a method of acting according to the mood and intuition of each situation, without revealing to oneself or to others the nature of the disguise involved in a feigned conversion.”＊＊
From this perspective, he concludes that it was “a feigned conversion that sought to engineer a reversal but failed to achieve it” (ibid.). If Konoe was indeed seen through to this extent, then he had no place to stand, either in this life or in the next. Perhaps this explains why, having lost all possibility of finding a way forward in this world, he ultimately chose death.
＊Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion, Middle Volume, pp. 106–107.
＊＊Ibid., p. 111.
3 The Intellectual Defiance of Tsurumi, Who Also Made Emperor Showa a Subject of Ideological Conversion
Leaving aside whether Konoe’s conduct, way of life, or political course should be characterized in precisely those terms, Tsurumi extended his judgment that Konoe’s behavior constituted feigned conversion to the conduct of Emperor Showa himself.
Tsurumi’s fearless willingness to go beyond conventional boundaries in this regard would later become indirectly connected to the chain of events surrounding the murder case that originated with the publication of the novel Furyu Mutan (1961) in Chuo Koron, then one of Japan’s leading general-interest magazines.
Drawing upon the aforementioned example of Konoe, Tsurumi states:
“The case of the emperor is an example in which an attempt to preserve non-conversion through feigned conversion ultimately failed.”
(Ibid.)
Tsurumi’s assertion, however, provides no supporting evidence, making it unclear on what basis he reached this conclusion. Depending on how one interprets his argument, it appears that he places Emperor Showa on the same level as Konoe in terms of conduct and behavior. This is why I have deliberately used the expression “intellectual defiance.”
Chapter 2 Summary
Presenting Evidence of the Collapse of Shiso no Kagaku‘s Research on Ideological Conversion
Tsurumi’s assessment of Ozaki’s course of life—or perhaps more accurately, his manner of death—in relation to the problem of ideological conversion reflects, in my view, Tsurumi’s intellectual insight. On the other hand, as noted above, his analysis breaks down when he places the words, actions, and conduct of the Emperor and Konoe on the same level. He reaches a definitive conclusion without presenting any evidence concerning the conduct and activities of Emperor Showa. This is why I have deliberately described his position as an act of “intellectual defiance.”
How was he able to make such a definitive judgment? Tsurumi does not provide the grounds for his assertion. I, however, will present evidence to support my own argument.
From the series of high-handed and rapid-fire directives issued by GHQ between November and December 1945, Emperor Showa understood what GHQ intended. Through communication and mutual understanding between GHQ and those surrounding it, the result was a kind of “alliance of strange bedfellows.” On New Year’s Day 1946, the Imperial Rescript on the Construction of a New Japan, which GHQ and the pro-democratization camp around it called the “Human Declaration of the Emperor,” was promulgated.
At the beginning of the document, as an expression of the emperor’s concern for the nation, the Charter Oath of Five Articles, proclaimed at the beginning of the Meiji era as the first national principle of modern Japan, was explicitly cited. In this way, the issue arising from the constraints imposed under the Occupation was, in a sense, brought to a resolution. Yet Tsurumi’s “intellect” appears to have completely failed to recognize the significance contained within this act.
As Emperor, and under the unprecedented circumstances of an occupied Japan following its first defeat in history—a situation in which the future was completely uncertain—how profound must have been the emperor’s anguish and concern? Yet, in contrast to Konoe’s wandering course and eventual escape through suicide, Emperor Showa maintained an unwavering position.
The mindset of the GHQ Civil Affairs Section and of the so-called progressive intellectuals who wished to cooperate with the “democratization” of Japan promoted by GHQ was based on the belief that Japanese militarism and the “Emperor system” were inseparable. Therefore, this misconception had to be overcome. It was necessary to conceptualize this transformation through the “Human Declaration of the Emperor.”
Looking toward the ultimate consequences of such intentions, Emperor Showa conveyed to the Japanese people under Occupation that the modern model of democratization was already embodied in the Charter Oath of Five Articles＊.
Whether Tsurumi understood this historical process or not, he possessed the courage to conclude that the trajectory of Emperor Showa had been a failure. In this respect, he must accept the criticism that his work was a “science of superficiality.”
＊Furthermore, on August 14, 1946, one year after the end of the war, Emperor Showa held a tea gathering attended by former and newly appointed senior statesmen. On that occasion, he asked whether the defeat in the recent war should not be considered in light of the disastrous defeat at the Battle of Hakusukinoe in 663 and the subsequent reconstruction of the Japanese state. The Chronicle of Emperor Showa, Vol. 10, p. 173.
Chapter 3 The Background to Japan’s Inward-Looking Orientation toward Ideological Conversion Rather Than Counterattack
— What Lay Behind the Retreat from the Internationalization of Research on Ideological Conversion? —
Introduction What Lay Behind the Retreat from the Internationalization of Research on Ideological Conversion?
The Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion, a groundbreaking achievement of the Society for the Study of Thought, was an intellectual undertaking made possible by Shunsuke Tsurumi, an extraordinary organizer with a particular talent for comparative analysis. In postwar Japan’s research on modern history, its broad perspective and meticulous attention to detail constituted a groundbreaking achievement. Although individual details may be subject to criticism, there is no reasonable basis for criticizing the work as a whole. It can be described as an unprecedented monument to scholarship. In terms of its overall scope, I cannot think of another undertaking concerning the intellectual history of modern Japanese people that is comparable to this collaborative study.
However, the more successful such an undertaking becomes, the more difficult it is to conceal the limitations of the perspective that emerged within it. The “limitations” referred to here reveal the intellectual fragility inherent in the Showa era, including the postwar period, when viewed in comparison with the international community.
It is natural to appreciate the participants for demonstrating the groundbreaking potential of an interdisciplinary approach that transcended partisan affiliations. At the same time, however, it is painful to point out its limitations. More importantly, these limitations have still not been identified to this day. This means that the limitations of perspective have also yet to be overcome.
The issue is not merely the limitations of research into the phenomenon of “ideological conversion” in modern and contemporary Japan. Rather, what has been exposed is the limitations of Japanese intellectuals themselves as they confronted the international community.
Tsurumi expressed the intention to avoid treating the concept of ideological conversion as something unique to Japan and to extend the study toward international comparison. When he made this statement, he possessed his own perspective and vision. His interest lay in the reactions that spread throughout the world, particularly among Western capitalist countries, in response to the shock of the Russian Revolution. Yet, as time passed, this ambition gradually faded. Why did the intellectual ambition that had once sought to encompass the world become buried?
I suspect that the realities of the Cold War between East and West made it difficult to obtain cooperation from the United States, which might otherwise have been expected to provide financial support. During the so-called 1960 Anpo protests, Tsurumi participated in demonstrations as one of the civic activists. I recall seeing a photograph in a weekly magazine of him visiting a place where police officers assigned to security around the National Diet were resting and distributing leaflets from the group to which he belonged, the “Voices Without Voices Association.” Was he perhaps viewed by the American side as displaying a degree of sympathy toward communism in his treatment of the subject?
1 The Issue at Hand: Perspectives Overlooked in Research on Ideological Conversion
The extensive research on ideological conversion provides profound insights into the intellectual and social conditions of Japanese intellectuals during the prewar and wartime Showa era. In my previous work, I placed particular importance on the Konoe Memorial (discussed below) as a source for understanding this type of phenomenon. In addition, I identified the “Ideological Conversion Statement” jointly issued by Manabu Sano and Sadachika Nabeyama (June 1933) as another document of comparable importance.
In my view, these two documents constitute some of the most valuable sources for understanding a cross-section of the intellectual history of the turbulent Showa era before and during the war.
It remains unclear within the field of the intellectual history of the Showa era whether ideological conversion should be viewed as submission to the authorities wielding the Maintenance of Public Security Law, or as a new intellectual leap forward. The basic tone of Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion cannot be denied to contain a critical nuance. Perhaps because of this stance, the Konoe Memorial was also interpreted as an example of feigned ideological conversion. It is difficult to deny that Konoe’s statement, regardless of his own role or existence, appears to have taken the form of an excuse addressed to history through an appeal directed toward the emperor.
There is, however, something that can be said in both cases. When circumstances are viewed through the concept—or ideal type—of ideological conversion, there is a limitation that prevents certain possibilities from even emerging as hypotheses.
The concentration of official efforts on compelling ideological conversion may simultaneously have weakened the will to devise opportunities for a borderless counterattack against the ideological systems that had produced such conversions. The public security authorities were characterized by a defensive posture against ideologies that crossed national borders and entered Japan to exert their influence. Did their strategy, based on the intellectual world in which they operated, recognize that “counterattack” was itself an available option?
2 The Failure to Extend the Perspective to Counterintelligence
To put it somewhat provocatively, the role of the Special Higher Police was essentially a game of “whack-a-mole” against infiltrating ideologies. As long as their official responsibility was the maintenance of domestic public security, it would be unreasonable to expect them to launch counterattacks across national borders.
The effort to eliminate, as far as possible, the manifestations of ideological contamination ultimately became the coercion of ideological conversion. Their perspective did not extend to counterintelligence. This may explain why the memoirs of Genki Abe, the first head of the Special Higher Police and one of its most influential figures, contain not a single word about the Sorge Incident＊.
Did the system itself contain an inherent tendency toward non-intelligence behavior in the actual process of law enforcement? It never reached the principle that “the best defense is a good offense.” In short, the reach of intelligence—the scope of knowledge—failed to extend beyond national borders. Because the adversary was borderless, Japan needed to develop a similarly borderless strategy, but it never reached that point.
In 1933, when Genki Abe stood at the center of the administration of the Maintenance of Public Security Law during the Showa era, the writer Takiji Kobayashi and 19 others died during interrogation. This is said to have been the highest number. It created the structure of “the Special Higher Police, torture, and death.” The manner in which this negative legacy has been addressed suggests the limitations of the professional ethics of knowledge among the Home Ministry bureaucrats of the Showa era＊＊.
＊The Truth Behind the Showa Turmoil, Hara Shobo, 1977; Chuko Bunko, 2006.
＊＊Judging from Abe’s memoirs, there is little indication that he reflected upon deaths caused by torture. He states that the interrogations strictly adhered to legal requirements but makes no mention of torture. Chuko Bunko, p. 148. It is difficult to understand such a state of mind.
3 The Limits of the Intellectual Preference for Westernization under the Banner of “Civilization and Enlightenment” as Seen in “Ideological Conversion”
The starting point for the formation of the modern Japanese state should have been the realization of the principles contained in the Charter Oath of Five Articles, the nation’s first set of guiding principles.
However, as previously pointed out, the revision enacted in 1928 and implemented through an Emergency Imperial Ordinance without completing deliberation in the National Diet established, in Article 1, a legal framework that placed the national polity (kokutai) alongside the system of private property.
There was no perspective, either at the time or subsequently, that the national polity itself had been contaminated by Westernization. It is important to recognize this as evidence of the superficial understanding of the Westernized bureaucratic establishment of the time.
From the perspective of counterintelligence against intellectual trends considered undesirable for Japan, efforts were weak. The overwhelming priority given to defense rather than counteraction was clearly manifested in the emphasis placed on the process of ideological conversion.
4 The Limitation of Forcing Ozaki to Convert While Being Unable to Do the Same to Sorge
As long as Japan remained passive, the only available countermeasure was to compel ideological conversion. Yet while the Japanese authorities could force Ozaki, a Japanese citizen, to undergo conversion, they could not do the same to Sorge.
Does this not reveal, in stark terms, the limitations of the Japanese authorities who relied upon ideological conversion as their primary countermeasure?
This was the image of Showa-era Japan when the modern Japanese state confronted an external enemy. It was for this reason that I was reminded of the fumie practice of the Tokugawa period. I have pointed out the commonality between the concept of “falling” (korobi) and ideological conversion (tenko).
Indeed, when compared with Showa-era Japan, which was unable to compel Sorge to convert, might the Tokugawa regime that produced the phenomenon of korobi bateren—Christian priests and believers who publicly renounced their faith—actually be regarded as more advanced?
Provisional Chapter 3 Summary
The Showa Regime’s Inability to Mount Anything More Than a Passive Counterattack
The ideological basis for compelling ideological conversion should have been rooted in the principles of a civilized Japan. Ozaki recorded, at length, his discoveries and insights concerning the world of knowledge. To that extent, his writings were honest.
But to what degree did the Japanese authorities who compelled him to make such statements act with genuine conviction? This question arises because their response was ultimately nothing more than an approach shaped by the experience of Westernization.
The superficial nature of this approach became apparent when one examines the response to the systematic cognitive and ideological warfare conducted by GHQ during the Occupation following Japan’s defeat. Did the possibility of counterattack simply disappear without ever becoming visible?
The repeated parliamentary resolutions affirming the “clarity of the national polity” (kokutai meicho) and the glorification of Japan that had been promoted during the prewar and wartime periods may have appeared to represent a traditional national doctrine, but were they not merely another variant of Westernization?
This may explain why the plan to transform Japan under the banner of democratization during the Occupation was accepted with surprising ease. Mark Gayn’s Japan Diary presents a candid cross-section of what might be described as the extraordinary situation at the time.
Masao Maruyama once used the cynical expression “staking everything on the falsehood of postwar democracy.” Yet, viewed from the perspective of later generations, has the reality of that “falsehood” not become increasingly evident?
One important point is that although the Showa-era authorities created the peculiar survival strategy of ideological conversion, their response remained confined strictly within national borders. They never reached the stage of developing a borderless ideological strategy and launching a counterattack. There was no functioning counterintelligence.
It is easy to see here the limitations of what Soseki Natsume predicted as a form of “civilization that must continue to slide superficially forward.” The cynical reality is that this tendency was inherited by the Society for the Study of Thought in its own research on ideological conversion.
Without first recognizing and overcoming this limitation, it will be impossible to reorganize Japanese thought in a manner capable of withstanding international competition.
There is insufficient awareness of this problem. In order to recognize it, Japan must first break free from what has become a chronic condition: its prolonged immersion in Westernization.
Chapter 4 Why Did Showa-Era Japan Lose the Struggle Against Comintern Infiltration?
— The Relationship Between Counterintelligence and Ideological Conversion —
Introduction The Incompleteness of the Problem’s Organization
I have so far addressed the issues related to the subject of this paper. Traditionally, however, there seems to have been little intention to approach the problem of ideological conversion from the perspective of counterintelligence. This can also be inferred from the fact that the only precedent for treating ideological conversion as a problem of intelligence—the intellectual capacity to understand and respond to threats—was the work undertaken by the Society for the Study of Thought, led by Shunsuke Tsurumi and others.
However, this undertaking was conducted at the height of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It cannot be said that their research on ideological conversion was entirely free from the constraints imposed by this contemporaneous environment.
Consequently, it is undeniable that the three-volume project ultimately remained incomplete. Given the importance of clarifying the issues that constituted modernity and exerted profound influence upon society, this incompleteness was unfortunate. The project remained unfinished as a work of global intellectual history.
In particular, the comparative research on ideological conversion in the Western world that Tsurumi had intended could have provided a powerful breakthrough for clarifying the respective intellectual structures of the two civilizations.
1 The Problem: How Did Japan Respond to Comintern Infiltration?
As briefly outlined above, the Japanese system sought to counter Comintern infiltration through the Maintenance of Public Security Law. Five years after the October Revolution of 1917, according to the Russian calendar, a Japanese branch was established in 1922. This was only one year after the Chinese branch had been established in the French Concession of Shanghai in 1921.
The significance of Moscow’s prioritization of mainland China cannot be underestimated when viewed in light of subsequent developments. From the perspective of Marx’s theory of capitalism, the strategic flexibility in applying the theory of imperialism can be seen in the decision to prioritize Chinese society, which was economically less developed than Japan.
For detailed accounts of the preparatory activities for revolution in Japan, readers should consult the relevant research and investigative literature. The Special Higher Police undertook meticulous operations in response to campus conflicts, the formation of labor unions, and the frequent occurrence of labor disputes.
The first “result” came six years later, in 1928, with the mass arrests known as the March 15 Incident. This was followed by the April 16 Incident the following year.
That same year, in October, the stock market crash began on Wall Street in New York and eventually developed into the Great Depression. Japanese silk stockings and other small-scale consumer goods that depended on the American market lost their outlets as consumption contracted, and structural economic depression became the norm. The frequency of labor disputes also rose rapidly.
The impoverishment of urban workers and the leftward shift of young intellectuals, including students at higher technical schools and universities and members of the military, progressed rapidly. Young and mid-ranking military officers became deeply involved in movements for national reform, although they themselves did not consider their ideas to be left-wing at all.
The Special Higher Police became convinced that Japan was being placed in a crisis by Comintern infiltration. The problem, however, lay in the content of this conviction and in the way it was addressed. The limitations that prevented the authorities from reaching the level of counterintelligence had become apparent.
2 There Are Two Forms of Counteraction
There are two ways of responding to a situation: active and passive.
An active approach does not merely react passively to circumstances but considers the possibility of attacking the adversary who initiates the action. The other approach emphasizes dealing with the causes of what has entered the country—in other words, a localized treatment or passive response.
The Special Higher Police regarded everything beyond Japan’s national borders as outside its jurisdiction. Its focus was therefore placed on identifying and suppressing the “disease” that flowed into the country.
Takeo Mitamura, formerly a staff member of the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, whom I discussed earlier, was deeply concerned about Comintern infiltration into Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, areas beyond Japan’s immediate borders but highly influential for Japan.
However, his concerns did not resonate with the Special Higher Police. Here, the gap between their respective problem awareness becomes apparent.
To use a simple analogy, Mitamura argued that the source itself had to be struck, whereas the Special Higher Police attempted to deal with the problem through localized treatment.
As a result, Mitamura, who was detained in prison, had the opportunity to see Ozaki from a distance, as Ozaki was also being held in detention pending trial.
This represents a symbolic phenomenon revealing the profoundly sad and difficult-to-describe irony that emerged when the authorities of modern Japan attempted to address this field.
3 Why Did the Authorities Fail to Pursue an Active Counterstrategy?
Why, then, did the Japanese authorities attempt to deal with revolutionary-oriented ideas and movements entering the country by relying upon the Maintenance of Public Security Law?
The “whack-a-mole” approach to infiltrating ideological “disease” could never end. The underlying threat would not disappear until the adversary itself stopped its activities. In other words, the initiative remained in the hands of the adversary overseas, at the source of the ideological transmission.
Under such circumstances, the primary focus naturally became “ideological conversion.”
To force Communist Party members or those suspected of Communist affiliation to confess, torture involving beatings and kicking was employed. It is necessary to clarify the origins of the intellectual “limitations” that led to the justification of such methods.
4 The Repercussions of the Ideological Conversion Statements of Manabu Sano, Sadachika Nabeyama, and Others
The ideological conversion statements issued in June 1933 have generally been regarded in postwar historiography as the result of capitulation under pressure from the authorities.
Leaders such as Sano and Nabeyama did not yield during interrogations by the Special Higher Police. Their profound internal struggles emerged only after they were transferred from the Special Higher Police to the prosecution and became subjects of investigation by prosecutors specializing in ideological offenses.
One aspect of the process between those demanding ideological conversion and those being pressured to convert is revealed in the Letter to Fellow Co-Defendants, which became the ideological conversion statement.
There is considerable room for different interpretations of this document.
The distance between the Comintern and Stalin’s theory of “socialism in one country,” presented in 1925, had a considerable influence on the motivations behind ideological conversion. An attempt to establish the logical consistency of this position inevitably created distance from Comintern internationalism.
Sano and his colleagues discovered a “civilized Japan,” and their perspective extended even to the possibility of launching a counterattack from Japan. They envisioned a socialist state based upon cooperation among the various peoples of East Asia.
From the standpoint of intellectual capacity, it is possible to see that their perspective extended beyond the intellectual horizons and field of vision of the prosecutors specializing in ideological offenses.
Even after their ideological conversion, they remained imprisoned until 1941. Under Japanese law, ideological conversion was treated as one matter, while convictions for violations of the Maintenance of Public Security Law remained intact.
There was no attempt whatsoever to make active use of the conversion of Sano and Nabeyama for wartime Japan. This was a passive response that prioritized the rule of law.
There is no indication of a supra-legal perspective that sought to make use of their intellectual transformation in the extraordinary circumstances of the Greater East Asia War, when Japan’s battlefields lay beyond its own borders.
Here too, the rigidity of the system, resulting from the intellectual limitations of those in authority when confronted with an unprecedented national crisis, becomes apparent.
5 Was There a Counterintelligence Perspective in National Governance?
Judging from the manner in which the issue of ideological conversion was handled, there is little evidence that those responsible for governing the nation sought to apply a counter-intelligence perspective.
What can be observed is only a passive and defensive posture.
This can only be interpreted as a lack of determination to overcome the Comintern’s global revolutionary strategy, one of the shocks that had been unleashed by the West.
By contrast, Sano and Nabeyama, who underwent ideological conversion despite possessing a will for transformation, together with the thousands of convicted and unconvicted individuals who sympathized with their conversion statement, clearly sought to break away from the ideological infiltration of the West while simultaneously pursuing transformation beyond national borders.
In terms of the content of their intentions, it is fair to say that they had moved beyond the expectations and calculations of the prosecutors specializing in ideological offenses.
Sano and Nabeyama, as ideological converts, possessed a perspective that far exceeded the field of vision of the Special Higher Police and ideological prosecutors, who operated within the framework of national laws such as the Maintenance of Public Law.
Their intention to arm themselves intellectually for a counterattack is evident in the development of their argument in the ideological conversion statement, even though its language may at times appear rigid.
I believe that later generations of Japanese have every right to take pride in the fact that, despite being imprisoned under such intense pressure, there were Japanese individuals who publicly expressed such intellectual insight＊.
＊In this sense, Toshitoshi Takahata’s Socialists in One Country—Manabu Sano and Sadachika Nabeyama (included in Volume I of the aforementioned Collaborative Research on Ideological Conversion) remains unable to move beyond the “perspective of betrayal.”
Provisional Chapter 4 Summary
The Precedent for the Habit of Observing CCP Infiltration from the Sidelines Lies in Modern Japan’s Passive Response
When we consider the present situation, it becomes apparent that the original weakness preventing Japan from mounting an active counterattack lay in the attitude of the national authorities already present in modern history.
The historical facts in this field cannot be disregarded. Physiological patterns of behavior tend to repeat themselves unless they are consciously recognized and placed into perspective.
Reading the ideological conversion statement of Sano and Nabeyama, one can clearly identify within it a conception of counterintelligence directed against Comintern infiltration.
It is possible to discern the beginnings of a serious counterattack against the civilizational shock emanating from the West.
If Japan possesses such valuable historical evidence and maintains the willingness to study it, there is absolutely no need to fear the infiltration of the historical warfare orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party.
[Editor’s Note (repeated)] This article is an external contribution (opinion piece) submitted by a practitioner with relevant field experience. The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of this institute.
