

# 「ジン・ジャン・アザディ」女性解放運動

ーイランおよびその他地域における社会解放運動の性格についてー

長崎大学多文化共生社会学部教授: ギュルベヤズ・アブドゥルラッハマン

Dr. GÜLBEYAZ Abdurrahman

## エグゼクティブサマリー

### 1. 社会と国家の構造的対立

社会は変化し続ける「開放系」、国家は安定を維持しようとする「閉鎖系」であり、この対立が抑圧と反発の循環(悪循環)を生む。

### 2. 安定のジレンマと暴力のコスト

国家が安定を維持するためには統制や暴力が必要となり、その結果として新たな抵抗が生まれ、安定は常に不完全でコストの高いものとなる。

### 3. 社会科学と言語の権力性

社会科学は現実を「言い換え(再記号化)」することで、暴力や不正を可視化するのではなく、むしろ隠蔽し、既存の権力構造を正当化する機能を持つ。

### 4. ジーナ・アミニ事件の本質

この出来事は単なる女性抑圧ではなく、「クルド人女性」という少数者に対する暴力であり、その少数性こそが運動の核心である。

### 5. 解放運動の成立条件と挫折

真の解放運動は少数者の視点から始まるが、多数派言語や既存秩序に回収されることで、その本質(解放性)は失われる。

## キーワード

- 開放系／閉鎖系(社会 vs 国家)
- 再記号化(トランスセミオシス)
- 少数性(マイノリティ性)
- 女性解放運動(ジン・ジャン・アザディ)

- ・ 権力と言語(社会科学の機能)

## 序論的考察と観察

本稿の着想は、2022年9月下旬、イランにおける大規模な抗議運動が始まった直後に生まれた。現在、約6か月を経て振り返り、概括的な評価を試みると、私は不可解で複雑かつ極めて曖昧な社会政治的構造に直面していると感じる。

イラン政権は再び一定程度の安定を取り戻したように見える。しかしその過程で、国家装置は既に相当に強固であった統制を、さらに強めざるを得なかったことは明白である。

これはあらゆる安定に内在する、文脈を超えた普遍的ジレンマである。剛体やその集合体に類似して、安定した社会構造とは、第一に社会構造に作用するすべての力が相互に打ち消し合うこと、第二にそのゼロサム状態が維持され続けることを前提とする。

社会政治的安定への欲望が「二つの悪の間での振り子運動」となる理由は、社会と国家の根本的対立にある。社会はその最小単位に至るまで「開かれたシステム」であり、絶えず変化し、環境に適応する。一方で国家は、少なくとも傾向的には「閉じたシステム」である。

社会は柔軟で可変的であり、外部環境に応じて変化するため、その動向を正確に予測することは不可能である。これに対して国家は、変化を最小限に抑え、外的刺激に対して鈍感である状態を維持するために、力を行使せざるを得ない。

しかし、この「維持機能」は、社会の動向が予測可能であることを前提とするため、根本的な矛盾を孕む。

ここから二つの問いが生じる。

第一に、社会の安定とは本当に望ましいものなのか。

第二に、その維持に伴うコストは受容可能なのか。

国家による抑圧は、新たな社会的反応と適応を引き起こし、悪循環を形成する。この種の悪循環は、1979年の革命以降、イランを継続的に苦しめてきた。

2022年秋の抗議運動後、イラン政府は監視カメラの大量設置によって統制回復を図っているが、それは莫大なコストを伴う。

暫定的評価として、イラン国内で最も抑圧されている人々にとって、革命の成果は極めて限定的である。一方でヨーロッパでは、この運動は出版ブームなどを通じて経済的利益を生んだ。

しかしこれらの著作が称揚するのは、結局のところ西洋啓蒙の価値体系である。「自由」「平等」「女性解放」といった概念が強調されるが、それは既存の枠組みの再生産に過ぎない。

---

## 社会科学の方法について

現代の社会科学は、不可視で神秘的な権威として機能し、人々に特定の言語を強制する。

特に、いわゆる周辺世界の知識人は、この言語を習得し、忠誠を示さなければ、知的領域での承認を得ることができない。

科学的活動とは本質的に「命名行為」であり、社会現象を再記号化(トランスセミオシス)することである。つまり、現実を別の言語体系へと変換する行為である。

この過程において、現実は変質する。例えば「虐殺」を専門用語で言い換えることで、それは可視的な暴力から抽象化され、受容可能なものへと変わる。

このように、社会科学の言語は既存の権力構造を再生産し、正当化する役割を果たす。

---

## 批判的回顧

イランでの抗議運動の発端は、ジーナ・アミニの死であった。

まず重要なのは、彼女の名前は「マフサ」ではなく「ジーナ」であるという点である。クルド人は国家によって名前の使用を制限されており、文化的抑圧の一形態がここに存在する。

次に重要なのは、この事件が単なる女性問題ではなく、「クルド人女性」という具体的存在に対する暴力であった点である。この点が無視されると、運動の本質は失われる。

---

## 「ジン・ジャン・アザディ」の歴史

1980年代後半、クルディスタンの政治運動において女性主導の思想転換が起こった。

特にクルディスタン労働者党(PKK)において顕著であり、女性解放が中心理念となった。

アブドゥッラー・オジャランは、女性解放こそが社会問題解決の鍵であると主張し、「ジネオロジー(女性学)」を提唱した。

「ジン(女性)」と「ジャン(生命)」は同一語源に由来する一方、「男」と「死」も同根であるという解釈が提示される。

「ジン・ジャン・アザディ(女性・生命・自由)」は1990年代に誕生し、ISとの戦いでも象徴的スローガンとなった。

2022年、ジーナ・アミニの死後、このスローガンはイラン全土に広がった。

---

## 挫折

しかしこの運動は二つの後退を経験した。第一に、スローガンがペルシャ語に翻訳されることで、クルド的少数性が消失した。第二に、男性中心的言説が再び支配的となり、「男性・祖国・繁栄」といった対概念が付加された。

これにより運動は再び既存の権力構造に回収された。

---

## 結語

ジーナ・アミニの事例は、すべての解放運動は少数者から始まるという原則を示している。

彼女は「クルド人」であり「女性」であった。この二重の少数性こそが解放の可能性を内包していた。

しかし、その特性が希薄化されたことで、運動は問題を抱える方向へと進んだ。

---

---

“Jin Jiyan Azadî”

## Summary

- 1. Structural Antagonism between Society and the State**  
Society functions as an open system characterized by constant change, whereas the state operates as a closed system seeking stability; this contradiction generates a recurring cycle of repression and resistance.
- 2. The Dilemma of Stability and the Cost of Violence**  
In order to maintain stability, the state must employ control and coercion, which in turn produces new forms of resistance, rendering stability inherently fragile and costly.
- 3. The Power Function of Social Science and Language**  
Social sciences operate through processes of “re-signification” (trans-semiosis), transforming reality in ways that often obscure violence and ultimately reproduce and legitimize existing power structures.
- 4. The Essence of the Jina Amini Case**  
The incident should not be reduced to a general issue of women’s oppression; rather, it represents violence against a specific minority subject—a Kurdish woman—whose minority status is central to understanding the movement.
- 5. Conditions and Limitations of Emancipatory Movements**  
Genuine emancipatory movements originate from minority positions; however, when absorbed into dominant languages and frameworks, their transformative potential is diminished.

---

## Keywords

- Open vs. Closed Systems (Society vs. State)
- Trans-semiosis (Re-signification)

- **Minority Position / Minority Signature**
  - **Women' s Liberation Movement (“Jin Jiyan Azadī”)**
  - **Power and Language (Function of Social Science)**
- 

## **Introductory Remarks and Observations**

The original idea for this article emerged in late September of 2022, shortly after the start of the large-scale mass protest actions in Iran. Looking back today after about 6 months and trying to draw a rough balance, I find myself confronted with an arcane, intricate and highly ambiguous socio-political plexus.

Once again, the Iranian regime seems to have stabilized to a certain degree. However, it is obvious that in the process of restoring internal stability, the state apparatus has been forced to tighten the reins, which had already been considerably tight.

This is the arguably context-free universal dilemma of stability of any kind. Not unlike a rigid body or an aggregate of such, a stable social formation necessarily presupposes, first, that all active, attacking forces of the social edifice have mutually annulled themselves and, second, that it is ensured that the resulting zero-sum game continues, persists.

What makes the desire, the obsession with socio-political stability an endless swinging back and forth between two evils, is the fundamental antagonism between society and the state. Society, its subsets down to its smallest indivisible building blocks<sup>1</sup> belong to the category of open systems. Whereas

---

<sup>1</sup> Although I want to leave the question unanswered in the present context as to what exactly this building block is supposed to be, for safety's sake it should be said here in advance that it is not the so-called "individual". (For a discussion of this matter cf. Gülbeyaz 2016: 13)

the state can and must be considered -tendentially at least- as a closed system. Society is highly pliable and changeable. It readily adapts to the impulses, circumstances, conditions of the constantly changing environment. Therefore, it is impossible to make reliable predictions about social affairs<sup>2</sup>.

In contrast, the situation with the state in this context is just the opposite. The state must use force to ensure that as little as possible changes, that the system is and remains insensitive and resistant to external impulses<sup>3</sup>. However, this function of preservation - ensuring the continued existence of what is as it is - presupposes the possibility of reliable predictions about social circumstances and processes.

On the one hand, this reasoning leads to the question of whether the stability of social systems is at all something a priori good, desirable, or whether precisely the opposite of what is understood by social stability is life-affirming and thus worthwhile.

On the other hand, it raises the legitimate question of whether social stability is at all feasible, practicable, and whether the costs that constantly arise in the process are not unacceptably high. The violence used by the state apparatus to control undesirable social impulses and processes inevitably unleashes new reactions and processes of adjustment on the part of society, creating a vicious circle.

A vicious circle of precisely this type has continuously afflicted Iran since the revolution in 1979. Today, about half a year after the start of the intense protest movements in the fall of 2022, the Iranian state apparatus is attempting to reestablish control, which is once again threatening to slip out of its hands, by equipping the streets and buildings of the cities with countless surveillance cameras. The surveillance system comes, of course, at tremendous material and personnel costs.

A quick interim assessment suggests that the fruits of the revolution are extremely limited from the point of view of the most oppressed and maltreated in Iran. Outside Iran, however, and especially in Europe, the revolt seems to have yielded a much more respectable harvest. Here, the revolution seems to have served to boost the pandemic-weakened economy by, for instance, setting off a small publishing boom. Best-selling books emerged in no time: “Diemutigen Frauen Irans: Wir haben keine Angst!”<sup>4</sup> by Natalie Amiri and Düzen Tekkal, “Wie man ein Schmetterling wird”<sup>5</sup> by Shole Pakravan & Steffi Niedertzoll or “Unser Schwert is Liebe”<sup>6</sup> by Gilda Sahebi – to name just a couple.

---

<sup>2</sup> Cf. a.o. Danermark et al. 2005: 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. “The state is, in fine, the state of opinion, a position of equilibrium.” (Ortega y Gasset 1957: 127)

<sup>4</sup> “The courageous women of Iran: We are not afraid

These and similar books took their place on the analogue or virtual shelves even before the blood dried on the streets of the cities of Kurdistan and Iran.

What is predominantly intoned in these works, however, is nothing other than the same old hymn of praise. What is effusively praised in them is the well-known programmed of the Western Enlightenment, which by now reigns without contender in the entire galaxy. It seems that for the authors of these works, the only lesson that can and must be learned from the last revolt, which lasted more than four months, and the bloody suppression of the same, is that the ideals of Western civilization are marvelous. Key words and phrases such as "unity, Iran, Iranian people, equality, freedom, all women, all ethnicities without discrimination, all minorities, feminist revolution in Iran" etc. dominate the textual reality constructed in these books.

All these interrelated, mutually conditioning and determining factors and phenomena make any reflection on social circumstances, events and processes of this kind extremely difficult. An important factor that exacerbates this difficulty is the modus operandi of the dominant social and human sciences, which traditionally declare such phenomena, cases and processes to be the object of their own production activity. Therefore, I believe that it is imperative, among other things for the purpose of self-legitimation, to take a critical self-referential look at the functioning of science - therein above all at that of social science.

## **On Social-Scientific Craft**

The overwhelming subliminal power of the now globally dominant mode of social scientific production, that acts from a dim, cryptic, mysterious, celestial thus practically inaccessible locus, seduces, urges and coerces the earthlings into speaking a language conceived and sanctioned by it, and at that speaking it exclusively.

Above all, those who, despite not – visibly / audibly / originally / genuinely i.e., certifiably – coming from the center of the Wallerstein Ian world system<sup>7</sup>,

---

<sup>5</sup> "How to become a butterfly".

<sup>6</sup> "Our sword is love".

<sup>7</sup> According to Immanuel Wallerstein, capitalism has always been - since the 15th-16th centuries - a world economy that was and is based on a worldwide division of labor. This worldwide economic division of labor is configured according to the principle of unequal exchange

seek to gain even a tiny modest place in this gigantic sector of production and reproduction of immaterial goods, must be able to speak the said language even much better than the actual inventors and developers of this language and – beyond that – they must seize every opportunity to demonstrate that they are committed to the great intergalactic civilization project based on this language.

Otherwise, they cannot realistically afford to hope to be blessed with something like acceptance and accreditation by the leaders / rulers of the trade. Expressed in more earthly terms, it is above all the brightest minds, the best learned, the best educated intellectuals of the periphery, of the so-called third world, who have to demonstrate and prove again that they have the acquired ability to reproduce the language of the master's adeptly, to imitate it flawlessly.

Regardless of whether one is a genuine member of the centre by birthright or an upstart/aspirant from the third world, the question of what constitutes the special, the differential in said language of science is to be answered in one and the same way. "The scientific activity which, to put it in a few words, springs from the separation of social production and linguistic processing or reprocessing of the same, manifests itself at first sight in the form of a quasi-translational process: it renames, codifies and encodes the social, that is, it subjects the social to a radical transformation, a process which I term, dependent on certain parameters, either 'trans-semiosis' or 're-semiosis'."<sup>8</sup>

Having stated that what the social institution scientist in all its forms and manifestations ultimately does is nothing more or less than a semiotic act i.e., naming or/and renaming, the nature and the contents of the scientific activity can safely be narrowed down to a single subspace of the hemisphere: language. Be it natural sciences, be it social sciences or humanities or be it engineering sciences the scientific production consists of – at least to a decisive extent – in linguistic production, i.e., in language.

The most crucial point in this respect is that the craft / the mode of operation, which differentially constitutes the special language underlying the social-scientific ductus, ultimately acts at the same time as an amplifier / repeater of the prevailing power relations.

More precisely and contextually, the language of the social sciences ultimately serves the established power, the apparatus of power. It serves to

---

between three functional zones. "As of 1450, the stage was set in Europe but not elsewhere for the creation of a capitalist world-economy. This system was based on two key institutions, a "world"-wide division of labor and bureaucratic state machineries in certain areas. [...] Then we shall look at the three zones of the world-economy each in turn: what we shall call the semiperiphery, the core, and the periphery." (Wallerstein 2011: 63)

<sup>8</sup> Gülbeyaz 2021: 102.

reproduce and legitimize the dominant power relations. In the context and at the level of interaction, friction and confrontation between the state and society, a single, unified scientific language is at the helm and at work. This language of modern science is structured in such a way that it is completely excluded that a production based on it does not exclusively benefit the ruler but also sometimes the ruled not always the oppressor but now and then also the oppressed. „The scientist sits in the figurative sense on the knee of the ruler.”<sup>9</sup>

In this context, it is highly relevant to repeatedly point out that even the intellectuals and scholars who come directly from the ranks of the aggrieved and oppressed cannot speak any other language than this as soon as they want to claim a share in what the sector of intangible goods – the sector of knowledge production – has to offer.

To conclude this section with a concrete example, i.e., to illustrate how scientific language and its application work in the knowledge production process, consider the following situation: If, for example, one renames a carnage, a massacre, a slaughter i.e., an act of systematic murder of a social group constructed in such or such a way in the course of scientific processing and replaces it by a scientific concept / by a technical term, one has, with or without intention, subjected the given fact / the event / the phenomenon / the sign to a radical metamorphosis. What was and is, is no more after such a trans-semiosis. It is now disappeared, covered up. By dint of the social-scientific intervention, it was purged, purified, and made tolerable. The unspeakable has become presentable and tellable.

### **A critical retrospective**

What had given rise to the ongoing events in Iran was the death (or more accurately murder) of Jina Aminî: an individual whose name is according to the Iranian police and other Iranian state apparatuses not Jina but Mahsa. Let us step back and briefly recall this beginning.

On September 16, 2022, a woman from Kurdistan province died while being in police custody in Tehran. She had previously been detained by Iran's morality police because, according to Iranian police and other state apparatuses, she had not worn the hijab correctly in public. Two hours after her arrest, she was taken from the police station to a hospital. According to the Iranian police and other state apparatuses, she had suffered a heart attack and a stroke. However, media outlets that are not funded and thus not entirely controlled by the Iranian police and other state apparatuses reported that the officers of the Iranian police and

---

<sup>9</sup> Gülbeyaz 2016: 36.

officers of other state apparatuses beat Amini's head after she resisted arrest.

I would like to emphasize two things about this initial picture. The highlights should be understood as vital, critical corrections. The first thing refers to the name of the individual who marks the beginning of the ongoing events. The second thing deals with the question of what these events, which did not subside for months, are primarily about.

Firstly, the name of this individual is not Mahsa but Jîna. Those people who are even a little bit familiar with the so-called Kurdish problem in the Middle East would immediately understand this correction and agree to it without much fuss. In this context, it might not be wrong to recall a well-known historical case for comparison. The matter with the Kurds and their names could be compared with caution to the situation of the Jews in Germany and Austria. When, at about the end of the 18th century, the Habsburg rulers imposed the convention of a fixed first and last name on the Jews in order to collect taxes more efficiently from them, Jews were officially allowed to decide on their own names. The reality, however, was that it was almost always Austrian officials who took the decision and made the selection of the name. A small selection of names that testify to the ingenuity of the officials or just their ossified hostility to Jews would be: "Mausefalle, Streusand, Geizhals, Krumnas"<sup>10</sup>.

And in the Third Reich, this practice was enshrined in law. On 17 August 1938, it was prescribed by law that - quote - "Jews may only be given such first names as are listed in the guidelines on the use of first names issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior". The "List of Jewish First Names" attached to the law contained 185 male first names and 91 female first names.

Now back to my first corrective intervention. That is, the correction of the name of the murdered individual from Mahsa to Jîna. The so-called "Kurd" in general, and especially the Iranian and Turkish versions of this type, cannot choose the names for their children. The state does not allow Kurdish names. More than that: in Turkey, since the introduction of the surname law circa ten years after the foundation of the republic, the Kurds had to put up with the most Turkish-sounding surnames. They were completely at the mercy of the state and its officials. Here are a couple of very common surnames in Northern Kurdistan: "Türk, Öztürk, Türkmen, Türkmenoğlu, Türkoğlu, Aslantürk, Turan"<sup>11</sup>

In order to counteract, among other things, the potential accusations or assumptions that bias and partiality are involved here, I will let another individual speak on this point instead of myself. I quote in the following a

---

<sup>10</sup> "Mousetrap, Road Sand / Grit, Penny-Pincher, Crooked Nose".

<sup>11</sup> "Turk, Unadulterated Turk, Turkmen, Turkmen's Son, Turk's Son, Lion-Turk, Turan"

passage from a speech by the Australian politician and Member of Parliament Tammy Anne Franks. She gave the speech on November 16, 2022, in the Australian Parliament as a Member of the South Australian Legislative Council.

I rise on behalf of the Greens in support of this motion. Jina was a young Kurdish woman. Her real name, like that of many Kurds, is banned in Iran, and so Jina was forced to use a Persian name, Mahsa, when dealing with the state. The banning of Kurdish names is just one form of cultural oppression against the Kurds in Iran who are barred from speaking, singing or teaching their language.

Like the Baloch and other ethnic minorities in Iran, the Kurds are denied political and cultural rights. There is an important and painful context of oppression behind the name Mahsa. It is imperative that when we speak of her suffering, her brutal death at the hands of the dictatorship and the incredible protest and resistance movements she inspired across Iran and all over the world, we respect her family and her memory by calling her by her real name. Her family have asked that she be referred to by the name that they gave her, the name Jina, the name that means 'life' in Kurdish. (Tammy Anne Franks)

My second corrective intervention refers to the apparent reason to which the beginning of the events following the murder of Jîna Aminî is attributed. I want to point out that the initial constellation of events was not primarily about hijab and the repression of women in Iran in general, but above all about the fact that Jîna was a woman from Kurdistan. That is: it was first of all about a concrete woman; not about the entire mathematical set of women but a concrete member of that set who could be defined and differentiated by precise social parameters. Only then was it and is it about women in Iran and women in general. If this initial and prime point were to be deliberately concealed, glossed over or inadvertently forgotten or disregarded, it would be inevitable that in the end nothing would be gained, but possibly everything would be lost.

### **"Jin Jîyan Azadî": A Short History**

During the second half of the 1980s, a radical theoretical-political transformation took place within the ranks of the leading political organizations in Northern Kurdistan. The trigger and driving force of this transformation was the emancipatory movement of women. This women-oriented and women-led transformation was most noticeable within the Kurdistan Workers Party.

From the beginning of the 1990s, the theoretical leadership of the movement also reacted to this transformation. On the one hand, women began to hold more and more important positions within the organization, and on the other hand,

the leading theoreticians, and above all Abdullah Öcalan, began to adapt and revise theoretical-programmatic premises to the effect that the Kurdish opposition movement must above all be a women's movement and must be led and directed by women.

In 'Liberating Life: Woman's revolution' schrieb Öcalan: "I believe that the key to the resolution of our social problems will be a movement for woman's freedom, equality and democracy; a movement based on the science of woman, called Jineolojî in Kurdish. The critique of recent woman's movements is not sufficient for analysing and evaluating the history of civilisation and modernity that has made woman all but disappear." This theoretical-political movement went so far that in 1998 Öcalan wrote in a pamphlet entitled "killing and transforming the dominant Man" that the man should be killed and transformed.

The multilingual television channel Med-Tv, founded in 1995, conceived a women's program called "Jin û Jîyan" (Woman and Life). This was probably the precursor to the slogan. In this respect, it would probably not be uninteresting to point out that the words Jin and Jîyan originate from one and the same etymon. This is a fact known at least to the experts. I would like to use this opportunity here and now to venture another step in this connection. I represent the opinion that also the Kurdish-language word pair 'mêr' and 'mirin' (man and death) go back on common etymological roots. What the etymology of Kurdish tells us, then, is that woman is life and man is death.

Since around the turn of the millennium, the slogan "Jin Jîyan Azadî" (woman life freedom) has been used by the Kurdish women's liberation movement. The slogan was - repeatedly emphasized - developed by the Kurdish women's liberation movement in the 1990s. This slogan was also perhaps the most effective weapon of the Kurdish women fighters in the fight against IS.

At the latest since the "International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women" (November 25, 2015), the slogan has also been used internationally outside Kurdish women's organizations. Parallel to the dissemination and popularization of the slogan, a musical genre, or at least a song format, also emerged that was textually based on the slogan.

---

When Jina, a Kurdish woman from the city of Saqez, was killed by Iranian police and other state apparatuses in the capital of Iran, where she was traveling for the first time<sup>12</sup>, and had to return to Saqez, her hometown, in a coffin, the slogan "Jin Jîyan Azadî" was heard first, as expected, during the funeral ceremony and then on the streets throughout Iran<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Neufeld 2022.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Gök 2022.

## The Setbacks

Then came the first setback. The Kurdish, that is, the minority signature of the slogan, was drowned out. The translation of the slogan into Persian, that is, into the majority language, was a fatal trans-semiosis<sup>14</sup>. This was a huge setback for the protest movement in Iran and outside Iran. Then came the second setback, which had already been pre-programmed and foreshadowed by the first: Not even two weeks had passed after Jina's murder when the entire well-known program, the entire phallocratic package, returned and took the wheel as before. The slogan “Jin Jiyan Azadî” (woman life freedom), which had become Persian in the meantime “zan zendegi āzādî”, paired up with a male partner “mard mihan ābādî” (man, homeland, prosperity) and thus submitted itself once again to the man i.e., to the death-driven phallocracy<sup>15</sup>.

## Closing Words

The case of Jîna Aminî and the individual Jîna embodied a universal socio-political principle: namely, that everything revolutionary, i.e., all conceivable effectively emancipatory changes in a society, must start from the minority. What makes the emancipatory nature of a social movement and the resulting transformation possible in the first place and secures it in the long term is above all the minority signature that must be unmistakably branded onto the respective movement or transformation.

Jina was not only Kurdish, but also a woman. The emancipatory potential / the immanent emancipatory disposition was doubly inherent in her. The reference to this double minority-affiliation of Jîna was, is or - to put it much more realistically - could theoretically provide the guarantee for the liberatory character and against the repressiveness in the resistance movement in Iran and elsewhere. Unfortunately, the situation turned to a doubly problematic direction in relation to the protests in Iran.

---

<sup>14</sup> I use the term “trans-semiosis” as the transmission/execution of a sign or sign action in a sign system other than the one it originally belongs to. “Trans-semiosis would be a renewed semiosis in another sign-system and -process, whereby resemiosis would constitute transference within the same sign-system or sub-system.” (Gülbeyaz 2016: 64)

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Gülbeyaz 2021: 105.

## Cited Works

Amiri, Natalie & Tekkal, Düzen. (2023). *Die mutigen Frauen Irans: Wir haben keine Angst!*. Elisabeth Sandmann Verlag.

Danermark, Berth et al. (2005). *Explaining Society: Critical realism in the social sciences*. Routledge.

Gök, Abdurrahman. (2022). *I am in İran and Rojhilat...* Mesopotamya Ajansi. <http://mezopotamyaajansi35.com/en/ALL-NEWS/content/view/189797>. Posted at 11:42 on 25 November 2022. Accessed on 18. July 2023.

Gülbeyaz, Abdurrahman. (2016). *Meaning in Language and Music: Sign and Slaughter*. Matsumotokobo.

Gülbeyaz, Abdurrahman. (2021) "The Universal and the Language-Specific in the Construction of Gender: A Comparative Semiotic Study." *Expressions of Gender in the Altaic World*, edited by: Münevver Tekcan and Oliver Corff. De Gruyter.

Neufeld, Dialika. (2022). *Who Was Jina Mahsa Amini?* Spiegel International. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/an-iranian-icon-who-was-jina-mahsa-amini-a-f6399d1e-589f-436e-8408-3c44861ba035>. Posted at 15:45 on 08. December 2022. Accessed on 18. July 2023.

Ortega y Gasset, Jose. (1957). *The Revolt of the Masses*. W. W. Norton & Company Inc.

Pakravan, Shole & Niedertzoll, Steffi. (2023). *Wie man ein Schmetterling wird*. Berlin Verlag.

Sahebi, Gilda. (2023). *Unser Schwert ist Liebe*. S. Fischer Verlag, 2023.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2011). *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, with a New Prologue*. University of California Press.