Japan's Intelligence Fragmentation and Reform

— Issues Raised at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan and the Need for a National Intelligence Strategy —

Published by: Middle East and Asia Strategic Information Institute (MEASII)
Date of Publication: September 7, 2026
Author: Kenshin Kinoshita

Introduction

On August 27, 2026, a press conference addressing Japan’s intelligence and counterintelligence system was held at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan.

https://www.youtube.com/live/ey-qMMym6tQ?si=Nk8P51B-JLmvSrSj (“Spy Paradise: Japan Confronts Its Espionage Problem” by Sergiy Korsunsky, Former Ukrainian Ambassador to Japan and James D.J. Brown, Professor, Temple University )

The discussion raised a range of concerns regarding vulnerabilities in Japan’s information security architecture. These included the historical perception of Japan as a comparatively permissive environment for foreign intelligence activities, deficiencies in intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, responses to foreign espionage, the development of professional intelligence personnel, the organizational structure of intelligence institutions, and the growing challenge of information manipulation through social media and artificial intelligence (AI).

However, the comparative analysis presented in this report argues that these challenges cannot be adequately addressed through a narrow legal debate over whether Japan possesses a comprehensive anti-espionage law.

The structural problem is broader and more complex.

Japan’s principal vulnerability does not simply arise from the absence of intelligence organizations or the insufficient collection of information. Rather, the central challenge lies in the fragmentation of institutions that possess relevant information and in the absence of a sufficiently integrated national capacity to consolidate information, conduct cross-sector analysis, and translate intelligence assessments into coherent policy decisions.

The issues discussed at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club primarily concerned:

Foreign intelligence activities;
Counter-espionage measures;
Intelligence organizations;
Legal frameworks;
Counterintelligence;
Professional intelligence personnel; and
Information manipulation through social media.

The analytical framework adopted in this report extends beyond these issues to include:

National intelligence integration;
Vertical administrative structures and institutional fragmentation;
Ministerial and organizational interests;
The intelligence-analysis capabilities of political parties and political leaders;
Influence operations directed at domestic society;
Information transmission through non-specialist and ordinary individuals;
The formation of credibility through international titles and affiliations;
Elections and appointments within the United Nations and other international organizations;
The social credibility associated with former military and government service;
Information dissemination through social media and online video platforms;
AI-enabled information manipulation;
Social fragmentation and polarization;
Political influence associated with international organizations and related institutions;
Foreign resident policy;
Population movement and national security; and
The institutional distinction between public security and national defense.

There are important areas of overlap between the concerns raised at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club and those addressed in this report. The fundamental difference, however, lies in the scope of analysis.

Whereas the discussion at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club focused primarily on foreign espionage and counterintelligence, this report expands the analytical framework to include the broader problem of Japan’s insufficient national intelligence integration and vulnerabilities in the formation of influence within domestic society.

Using the issues raised at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club as a starting point, this report presents a broader framework for understanding Japan’s information security challenges and proposes concrete directions for institutional reform and the development of a national intelligence strategy.

Executive Summary

1. Japan’s Primary Challenge Is Not a Lack of Information, but the Fragmentation of Information

Japan possesses numerous organizations that collect, manage, and analyze information in such areas as law enforcement, national defense, diplomacy, public security, economic security, and cybersecurity.

However, the existence of information within individual institutions does not automatically translate into national intelligence capability.

Unless relevant information can be integrated across institutional boundaries, analyzed in relation to common national security challenges, and effectively incorporated into policy decision-making, it remains difficult for the state to develop a comprehensive understanding of emerging threats.

Accordingly, Japan’s information security reform should not be limited to the creation of additional intelligence organizations.

The more fundamental requirement is to establish a national mechanism capable of preserving the specialized expertise of individual institutions while integrating necessary information and conducting comprehensive analysis from a whole-of-government and national-security perspective.

The central objective should therefore be the development of an intelligence architecture that connects information collection, analytical assessment, strategic coordination, and policy decision-making.

2. Institutional Fragmentation Has Historical and Structural Roots

The development of Japan’s modern state following the Meiji Restoration was significantly influenced by personal networks and institutional relationships involving individuals from former feudal domains.

The historical relationship between networks associated with Chōshū and the Imperial Japanese Army, and between those associated with Satsuma and the Imperial Japanese Navy, has often been cited as a symbolic example of how human networks influenced the formation of political and military institutions.

This report does not suggest a simplistic or direct continuity between historical domain-based networks and contemporary Japanese politics.

Nevertheless, the broader structural lesson remains relevant.

When personnel, information, budgets, authority, and institutional expertise become concentrated within separate organizations, those organizations may develop their own institutional interests, priorities, and perspectives.

This dynamic provides an important framework for understanding contemporary challenges related to vertical administrative structures, bureaucratic interests, institutional competition, and political decision-making.

The problem, therefore, is not the existence of specialized institutions themselves. Specialization is essential in a complex modern state.

The challenge is to develop effective mechanisms capable of coordinating institutions without undermining their professional expertise or creating excessive concentration of authority.

3. Modern Influence Operations Extend Beyond Professional Intelligence Personnel

Contemporary intelligence activities and influence operations are not conducted exclusively by professional intelligence officers or covert operatives.

Influence may develop through a wide range of legitimate and illegitimate social channels, including businesses, academic and research institutions, political organizations, international organizations, social media platforms, online video distribution networks, civil society organizations, and ordinary individuals.

The analytical challenge is therefore not to label individuals as foreign agents solely on the basis of public information, personal associations, or unverified suspicions.

The more important task is to analyze how individuals, networks, information, financial resources, titles, institutional affiliations, and social credibility may interact to generate political or social influence.

A responsible national intelligence framework must distinguish clearly between legitimate international exchange, lawful political activity, and activities that may constitute improper or covert influence.

This distinction requires evidence-based analysis, legal safeguards, institutional transparency, and respect for fundamental rights.

4. International Titles, Positions, and Elections May Become Part of the Influence Environment

Positions, appointments, and elections within the United Nations and other international organizations constitute legitimate elements of international diplomacy and multilateral engagement.

At the same time, international titles and institutional affiliations may generate substantial perceptions of expertise, authority, and social credibility within domestic society.

For this reason, the following potential structure of influence deserves objective analysis:

Elections or Appointments within International Organizations

↓

Personal and Institutional Networks

↓

International Titles and Affiliations

↓

Social Credibility and Public Recognition

↓

Media and Social Media Dissemination

↓

Political and Social Influence

The issue is not the possession of an international title, position, or affiliation itself.

The essential analytical question is what qualifications, authority, institutional mandate, and representative legitimacy a particular title actually possesses, and how the credibility associated with that title may subsequently be translated into political or social influence.

Such analysis must be conducted objectively and without automatically treating international engagement as evidence of improper activity.

5. Foreign Resident Policy Must Be Addressed Across Administrative, Public Security, and National Security Institutions

Issues concerning foreign residents cannot be addressed solely through immigration control.

They involve multiple areas of government policy, including:

Residence administration;
Employment;
Education;
Social security;
Taxation;
Local government administration;
Public security;
Land acquisition;
Economic security; and
National security.

The author has therefore proposed the establishment of an Interagency Foreign Resident Policy Task Force.

Such a mechanism should not be designed to subject foreign residents to indiscriminate surveillance or exclusion.

Rather, within the framework of applicable law, due process, and personal data protection, it should enable the appropriate coordination of information relevant to administration, public security, and national security.

The objective would be to strengthen the government’s capacity for comprehensive policy assessment while maintaining legal safeguards and respect for individual rights.

6. An Objective Evaluation and Points-Based Framework Should Be Considered

The author has previously proposed consideration of an objective evaluation and points-based framework for certain aspects of foreign resident policy, based on observable conduct and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

As a fundamental principle, the following characteristics must not be used as evaluation criteria:

Nationality;
Ethnicity;
Race;
Religion;
Political ideology; or
Legitimate political opinions.

At the same time, consideration may be given—subject to appropriate procedures, transparency, due process, and human rights protections—to objective administrative factors such as:

Lawful residence status;
Compliance with applicable laws and regulations;
Fulfillment of public obligations, including tax obligations;
The submission of false applications or declarations; and
Fraudulent or improper use of administrative systems.

The purpose of such a framework must not be exclusion.

Rather, it should seek to appropriately recognize and support individuals who comply with the law and participate lawfully and stably in Japanese society, while ensuring that serious violations of the law and deliberate abuse of public systems are addressed through appropriate legal and administrative procedures.

Towards a National Intelligence Strategy

The issues identified in this report point to the need for a broader reform agenda.

Japan’s future information security framework should move beyond a model based primarily on separate institutions operating within narrowly defined jurisdictions.

A more effective national architecture should be based on the following principles:

1. Intelligence Integration

Establish mechanisms for integrating relevant information across government institutions while preserving the specialized expertise of each organization.

2. Strategic Analysis

Develop analytical capabilities capable of identifying long-term patterns, emerging risks, and connections between seemingly unrelated developments.

3. Counterintelligence and Influence Analysis

Strengthen the capacity to analyze espionage, foreign interference, covert influence, and information manipulation while maintaining strict legal and evidentiary standards.

4. Institutional Coordination

Reduce the risks created by excessive institutional fragmentation and improve coordination across government ministries and agencies.

5. Democratic and Legal Safeguards

Ensure that intelligence and security reforms remain subject to the rule of law, due process, democratic accountability, and the protection of fundamental rights.

6. AI and Information Resilience

Develop national capabilities to identify and respond to AI-enabled disinformation, coordinated information manipulation, and emerging forms of digital influence.

Conclusion

Japan’s information security challenges should not be understood solely as a question of whether the country possesses a sufficient number of intelligence agencies or whether a particular anti-espionage law exists.

The more fundamental issue is the capacity of the state to understand complex and interconnected threats.

Information collected by police, defense institutions, diplomatic organizations, economic security authorities, cybersecurity agencies, and other bodies may remain insufficiently effective if it cannot be integrated into a coherent national assessment.

At the same time, the modern information environment has expanded the nature of influence itself.

Political and social influence may emerge through complex interactions involving individuals, institutions, international affiliations, financial networks, social credibility, media, social media, and emerging AI technologies.

For this reason, Japan requires a more comprehensive approach to national information security.

The objective should not be the indiscriminate expansion of surveillance or the automatic suspicion of international engagement. Nor should legitimate foreign residents, international organizations, academic institutions, or individuals be treated as security threats solely on the basis of their nationality, affiliation, or personal associations.

Instead, Japan should develop an evidence-based, legally accountable, and strategically integrated national intelligence architecture capable of distinguishing legitimate activity from genuine security risks.

The central challenge for Japan in the coming decades will therefore be to establish a system capable of connecting information, institutions, analysis, and policy.

Japan’s future national security will depend not only on the quantity of information it possesses, but on its ability to understand the relationships among information, identify strategic patterns, and transform knowledge into effective national decision-making.

Keywords

National Intelligence and Information Security
Intelligence Integration
Counterintelligence and Influence Operations
International Titles and Social Credibility
Foreign Resident Policy and National Security

Introduction

Japan possesses a range of intelligence organizations and information-gathering functions across its government ministries and agencies. The police, defense, diplomatic, public security, and other administrative institutions collect and analyze information in accordance with their respective mandates. However, it is difficult to conclude that politicians and political parties in Japan have established sufficiently institutionalized professional advisory capabilities for independently collecting and analyzing information necessary for national security decision-making.

When political leaders become excessively dependent on reports from government officials, official government announcements, and media coverage, there is a risk that important national policy decisions may be made without sufficient independent analytical capacity. This does not mean, of course, that politicians should be permitted to freely collect classified or confidential information.

What is required is the capacity to professionally analyze publicly available information and information lawfully obtained, thereby enabling policymakers to examine national policy from perspectives that may differ from those of administrative institutions.

When considering the relationship between politics and national intelligence, the Richard Sorge Affair in modern Japanese history provides an important historical lesson.

The Richard Sorge Affair should not be understood merely as the activities of a single intelligence operative. Rather, it illustrates a broader structural problem: personal relationships within a country, social credibility, political networks, and access to information may potentially be exploited for foreign intelligence purposes.

On August 27, 2026, a press conference concerning Japan’s intelligence organizations and vulnerabilities in its national intelligence and information security system was held at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan.

The central themes of the press conference included Japan’s longstanding reputation as a “spy paradise,” anti-espionage legislation, foreign intelligence activities, and the reform of Japan’s intelligence system.

The vulnerabilities in Japan’s intelligence organizations and counterintelligence framework raised during the conference constitute important issues for consideration in the context of Japan’s national security. However, it is insufficient to reduce the discussion to a simple binary question: Does Japan have intelligence organizations? Does Japan have an anti-espionage law?

Japan already possesses information-related functions within the police, defense establishment, diplomatic institutions, and other government agencies. The more fundamental question is whether Japan has sufficiently established the capacity to integrate information held by different organizations at the national level, analyze that information comprehensively, and connect the resulting assessments to policy decision-making.

Furthermore, modern influence operations are not conducted solely by professional intelligence operatives in the traditional sense.

Individuals, personal networks, titles and institutional affiliations, financial resources, information dissemination, and social credibility may, through social media, online video platforms, international organizations, private organizations, and other social networks, potentially be transformed into political or social influence.

This report therefore presents a comparative analysis that clearly distinguishes between the issues raised at the press conference held at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan and the author’s own proposals for reforming Japan’s national intelligence and information security system.

The arguments advanced by the speakers at the press conference, as well as the issues raised during the subsequent question-and-answer session, are clearly distinguished from the author’s own policy recommendations presented in this report.

The individual cases discussed in this report are not intended to identify or characterize any specific individual as a foreign intelligence operative or as the perpetrator of any other unlawful activity.

Rather, the central subject of this report is the structure through which individuals, personal networks, titles and institutional affiliations, financial resources, information dissemination, and social credibility may, in contemporary society, be transformed into political and social influence.

In this edition prepared by the Middle East and Asia Strategic Information Institute (MEASII), the analysis also examines the historical and institutional background of Motojiro Akashi, the Richard Sorge Affair, the Nakano School, the institutional transition from the National Police Reserve to the Japan Self-Defense Forces, elections within the United Nations and other international organizations, national intelligence and information security institutions, and foreign resident policy.

Through this broader historical and institutional analysis, this report seeks to examine the structural challenges facing Japan’s national intelligence and information security system and to identify directions for future reform.

Chapter 1

Issues Raised at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan Press Conference

1.1 Japan as a “Spy Paradise”

At the press conference held at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on August 27, 2026, concerns were raised that Japan may be operating in an environment that remains vulnerable to foreign intelligence activities.

One of the central concerns raised during the conference was that Japan continues to face challenges regarding the development of an independent intelligence architecture and a comprehensive counterintelligence framework, potentially creating an environment in which foreign intelligence activities can operate with relative ease.

The strengthening of Japan’s intelligence capabilities and the development of an effective counterintelligence system were therefore identified as important policy challenges.

An important point, however, is that the challenges facing Japan are not limited to conventional military threats.

Modern intelligence activities extend across a wide range of fields, including:

Military technology;
Advanced technology;
Cyberspace;
Economic affairs;
Diplomacy;
Politics; and
Social and societal information.

Protecting national security therefore requires not only the collection and analysis of military intelligence, but also a comprehensive analytical capability encompassing technology, economic affairs, and broader social structures.

1.2 Speakers at the Press Conference and Their Concerns

The press conference was held on August 27, 2026, from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

The principal participants included:

Moderator: Martin Fackler
Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan
Sergiy Korsunsky
Former Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan
James D. J. Brown
Professor at Temple University and a specialist in Japan–Russia relations and Russian intelligence activities targeting Japan

Professor Brown has published a book examining the history of Russian intelligence activities directed toward Japan. He is also expected to publish a subsequent volume examining Russian intelligence activities targeting Japan from 1945 to the present.

Against the historical and contemporary background of such intelligence activities, the press conference raised important questions regarding Japan’s intelligence system and its counterintelligence capabilities.

1.3 Vulnerabilities in Japan’s Intelligence and Information Security System

When the issues raised during the press conference are organized and examined, several challenges can be identified within Japan’s intelligence and counterintelligence framework, including:

The fragmentation of intelligence organizations;
Challenges associated with establishing a comprehensive counterintelligence legal framework;
A shortage of specialized personnel;
The disruption of professional expertise caused by frequent personnel rotations;
The need to respond to long-term infiltration and influence activities;
Technology leakage through third countries;
Information manipulation through social media; and
The growing challenges posed by artificial intelligence and cyberspace.

These issues should not be regarded as entirely separate or independent problems.

Even when a particular government ministry or agency possesses important information, it remains difficult to develop a comprehensive understanding of a threat if that information is not appropriately shared with relevant institutions and analyzed as part of an integrated national assessment.

1.4 The Problem Is Not the Absence of Intelligence Organizations, but the Lack of Intelligence Integration

Japan possesses organizations that handle intelligence and security-related information in such areas as public security, law enforcement, national defense, diplomacy, and other governmental fields. Therefore, it would not be accurate to suggest that Japan possesses no intelligence organizations whatsoever.

The more fundamental question is whether Japan has established a sufficiently effective mechanism for integrating and analyzing information held by different institutions across organizational boundaries from the perspective of national security.

The author therefore views Japan’s intelligence challenge not primarily as a question of the number of intelligence organizations, but rather as a question of Japan’s national capacity for intelligence integration.

Chapter 2

A Comparative Analysis of the Press Conference and the Author’s Policy Proposals

— From “Counter-Espionage Measures” to a “National Intelligence Strategy” —

Area of Analysis	Issues Raised at the Press Conference	Author’s Analysis and Policy Proposals	Policy Direction
Fundamental Challenge	Vulnerability to foreign intelligence activities	Structural fragmentation of national intelligence functions	Integrated analysis at the national level
Primary Threats	Foreign espionage activities	Espionage, influence operations, and efforts to create social division	Comprehensive threat analysis
Scope of Analysis	State secrets, military technology, and related areas	Politics, society, the economy, social media, and population movements	Cross-sector analysis
Legal Framework	Challenges associated with counterintelligence legislation	Legal measures alone cannot adequately address modern influence operations	Consideration of a comprehensive institutional framework
Intelligence Organizations	Organizational fragmentation	Information discontinuity caused by vertical administrative structures	Strengthening intelligence integration functions
Professional Personnel	Insufficient specialization	Loss of accumulated expertise resulting from frequent personnel rotations	Establishment of a long-term professional career system
Domestic Society	Primarily an indirect area of analysis	Social influence operations identified as a major analytical challenge	Development of influence-operation analysis capabilities
Social Media	Disinformation and information manipulation	Amplification of social division and polarization	AI and social media analysis capabilities
Civil Society	The role of intelligence specialists	Institutionalization of public–private cooperation	Lawful information sharing
International Organizations	Part of the broader international environment	International titles, elections, and the formation of social credibility within institutions such as the United Nations	Objective verification of authority and institutional affiliation
Foreign Resident Policy	Its relationship to public security and national security	Fragmentation of relevant administrative information	Establishment of an Interagency Foreign Resident Policy Task Force
Administrative Management	Fragmentation of information	Consideration of an objective evaluation framework	Due process and the protection of human rights
National Defense	Analysis as a national security issue	Clear distinction between public security and national defense	Clarification of institutional roles and responsibilities
Ultimate Objective	Strengthening counterintelligence capabilities	Building national information security capacity across the entire state	Establishment of a National Intelligence Strategy

Comparative Assessment

As this comparison demonstrates, the two approaches should not be regarded as being in opposition to one another.

Rather, the author’s analysis can be understood as expanding upon the issue of Japan’s counterintelligence vulnerabilities raised at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan press conference and placing those vulnerabilities within the broader structural context of Japan’s national intelligence system.

While the press conference identified specific vulnerabilities in Japan’s counterintelligence capabilities, the analysis presented in this report goes further by examining the structural problems within Japan’s national institutions, the formation of social and political influence, and the country’s capacity to integrate and analyze information across organizational and sectoral boundaries.

Chapter 3

Japan’s Intelligence Organizations and Their Historical Background

— From Motojiro Akashi, the Richard Sorge Affair, and the Nakano School to the Postwar System —

Reforming Japan’s national intelligence and information security system requires more than an examination of its present-day institutions alone. Why are Japan’s intelligence functions dispersed among multiple organizations? Why has it been difficult to integrate public security, diplomacy, national defense, and intelligence functions into a coherent national framework?

The answers to these questions are rooted in Japan’s historical development, from the formation of the modern state through the prewar and wartime periods to the postwar era.

3.1 The Formation of the Modern Japanese State and Organizational Networks

Following the Meiji Restoration, Japan faced the urgent task of constructing a modern state within a relatively short period of time.

Political, military, diplomatic, and administrative institutions were rapidly developed. During this process, however, personal networks centered on individuals originating from the former feudal domains played an important role.

The relationships commonly associated with:

Networks connected to Chōshū and the Imperial Japanese Army; and
Networks connected to Satsuma and the Imperial Japanese Navy

have often been regarded as symbolic examples of the role that personal networks played in the formation of Japan’s modern state.

The important point is that, during the formative period of the modern Japanese state, personal networks and institutions were closely interconnected.

As state institutions developed, each organization accumulated its own:

Personnel;
Information;
Specialized knowledge;
Budgets;
Authority; and
Organizational culture.

Such specialization is necessary for the effective functioning of a modern state. At the same time, however, the accumulation of information and authority within separate organizations can make integrated national decision-making more difficult.

The author views this issue as part of a long-term organizational structure:

Personal Networks in the Formation of the Modern State

↓

Institutional Specialization

↓

Accumulation of Information and Authority

↓

Institutional Fragmentation

↓

Vertical Administrative Structures

↓

Ministerial Interests

↓

Political Interests

3.2 Motojiro Akashi and Intelligence Activities in Modern Japan

When considering intelligence activities in modern Japan, the activities of Motojiro Akashi provide an important historical example.

During the Russo-Japanese War, Akashi operated primarily in Europe and is widely regarded as having gathered information and developed contacts concerning political conditions, anti-government movements, and national movements within the Russian Empire.

This historical case demonstrates that intelligence activities involve more than simply collecting classified or secret information.

In competition among states, the following activities may be closely connected to national strategy:

Understanding political conditions;
Analyzing social movements;
Building personal networks;
Assessing internal political divisions within foreign countries; and
Influencing international public opinion.

In other words, intelligence activities should not be understood simply as “stealing secrets.” The ability to understand the structure of a society, analyze human relationships, and anticipate political change is itself a fundamental element of intelligence capability.

3.3 Lessons from the Richard Sorge Affair

The Richard Sorge Affair remains one of the most significant cases in the history of Japan’s intelligence and information security.

The intelligence activities associated with Sorge were connected not only to military information but also to political, diplomatic, and personal networks within Japan.

The importance of the case lies not simply in the fact that a foreign intelligence operative existed.

More fundamentally, it demonstrates that foreign intelligence activities may seek to exploit personal networks, political relationships, and social credibility within a country.

Intelligence activities do not necessarily operate according to the simple model of:

Foreign Operative

↓

Theft of State Secrets

In some cases, the structure may be considerably more complex:

Personal Networks

↓

Relationships of Trust

↓

Access to Information

↓

Intelligence Analysis

↓

Information Transmission

↓

Use in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

An important lesson for contemporary society is that specific individuals must not be casually equated with “Sorge” or identified as foreign intelligence operatives without evidence. The purpose of this report is not to spread suspicion against particular individuals.

Rather, the lesson to be drawn from the Richard Sorge Affair is that vulnerabilities in information security are related not only to the protection of state secrets, but also to human relationships, social credibility, and the sharing of information among institutions.

3.4 The Nakano School and Intelligence Education

In prewar Japan, the Nakano School was established as a specialized educational institution associated with intelligence activities and special operations. Its historical role requires careful and multifaceted examination, including its relationship to Japan’s wartime history.

From the perspective of national security, however, one important historical point is that Japan at the time recognized that intelligence activities required specialized education and the long-term development of professional personnel.

Effective intelligence analysis requires advanced expertise in areas such as:

Foreign language proficiency;
Regional studies;
Political analysis;
Historical knowledge;
Psychological analysis;
Information collection;
Information assessment; and
Analysis of personal and organizational networks.

This issue remains relevant in contemporary Japan.

Regular personnel rotations within government institutions can provide important administrative and organizational benefits. However, in highly specialized fields such as intelligence analysis, which require long-term experience and accumulated knowledge, frequent personnel rotations may hinder the development and retention of professional expertise.

3.5 The Institutional Transition from the National Police Reserve to the Japan Self-Defense Forces

Japan’s national institutions underwent significant changes following the Second World War.

Prewar military organizations were dismantled, and Japan’s state institutions were reorganized under a new constitutional and democratic framework during the period of the Allied Occupation.

As the Cold War developed, the National Police Reserve was established, followed by the National Safety Force and eventually the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

This institutional transition is of fundamental importance in understanding Japan’s postwar security system.

In postwar Japan, reflecting upon the experience of prewar and wartime militarism, careful institutional safeguards were established concerning:

Military organizations;
Police institutions;
Intelligence activities; and
The exercise of state power.

These safeguards have played an important role in protecting democracy and fundamental human rights through civilian control and democratic governance.

At the same time, however, Japan continued to face the challenge of determining how intelligence capabilities necessary for national security should be developed within such a democratic and legally constrained framework.

3.6 The Postwar System and the Fragmentation of Intelligence Organizations

In postwar Japan, intelligence-related functions developed across a wide range of institutions, including:

Police organizations;
Defense institutions;
Diplomatic organizations;
Public security agencies;
Economic institutions; and
Other government bodies.

This institutional structure has helped preserve specialized expertise within individual organizations. At the same time, however, it has also created challenges related to the integration of information.

The solution is not simply to merge all intelligence-related institutions into a single organization.

What is required is the development of a national capacity capable of appropriately integrating and analyzing information necessary for national security while preserving the specialized expertise of individual institutions.

3.7 Lessons from History for Contemporary Japan

Motojiro Akashi, the Richard Sorge Affair, the Nakano School, and Japan’s postwar institutional reforms belong to different historical periods.

They cannot simply be applied directly to contemporary circumstances. Nevertheless, they share an important underlying lesson: a state cannot ensure national security merely by collecting information.

What is required is a comprehensive information security system:

Information Collection

↓

Professional Analysis

↓

Interagency Information Sharing

↓

National-Level Integration

↓

Policy Decision-Making

↓

Democratic and Legal Oversight

The fundamental challenge is therefore to establish an integrated national framework in which information is not only collected, but professionally analyzed, appropriately shared, incorporated into strategic decision-making, and subject to democratic and legal accountability.

Chapter 4

United Nations and International Organizational Titles and the Formation of International Credibility

— Elections within International Organizations, Personal Networks, and the Structure of Influence —

When considering contemporary information security, it is no longer sufficient to focus solely on traditional forms of intelligence activity, such as the theft of state secrets or the collection of military information.

In contemporary society, an individual’s title, organizational affiliation, international position, personal networks, and social credibility can themselves become important factors in the formation of political or social influence.

In particular, titles associated with the United Nations and other international organizations may sometimes be perceived by the general public as indicators of authority or professional expertise. Experience within international organizations and the development of international personal networks may also contribute to subsequent social credibility, the capacity to disseminate information, and political influence.

This chapter examines the structures through which elections, positions, and titles within international organizations may contribute to the formation of international credibility and, in some circumstances, how such credibility may subsequently be transformed into social or political influence.

This chapter does not regard the legitimate activities of any particular international organization or individual as inherently problematic. Nor does it characterize individuals who hold positions or titles associated with international organizations as foreign intelligence operatives or as participants in unlawful activities.

Rather, the subject of analysis is the structure through which an individual’s title, personal networks, social credibility, and information dissemination may, in contemporary society, be transformed into political or social influence.

4.1 Elections within International Organizations and Interstate Diplomacy

Within the United Nations and other international organizations, elections or selection processes are conducted for a wide range of positions, including offices, committee memberships, board positions, and other institutional roles.

States may conduct long-term diplomatic efforts and seek international support in order to secure important positions for their nationals within international organizations. Such processes may involve not only the qualifications of an individual candidate but also the diplomatic activities of the candidate’s country or organization, personal relationships with representatives of other states, requests for support, and broader relationships of international trust.

International organizational elections should therefore not be viewed merely as matters of individual prestige or professional achievement. In certain circumstances, they may also relate to a country’s international voice, the development of human resources, diplomatic networks, and future international cooperation.

Personal networks formed through international activities may subsequently become valuable social and professional assets in fields such as diplomacy, academic research, international cooperation, and civil society.

The United Nations itself was established within the international order that emerged following the Second World War. Japan, however, continues to face certain historical issues, including the continued presence of the so-called “enemy state clauses” in the text of the United Nations Charter.

Japan is also one of the world’s major contributors to the United Nations system. At the same time, while the United States and China are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Japan is not.

These circumstances demonstrate that influence within the international community is not necessarily proportional to a country’s level of economic or financial contribution. International influence is shaped by multiple factors, including economic capacity, diplomatic capability, international personal networks, and the presence of qualified personnel within international organizations.

4.2 International Titles and Social Credibility

In contemporary society, the name of the United Nations or another international organization may sometimes convey an impression of authority or professional expertise to the general public.

For example, titles or positions such as:

An official position within an international organization;
Membership on an international committee;
Representation at an international conference;
A position on a specialized committee;
A title associated with an international NGO; or
Service as an adviser or expert to an international organization

may create the impression that an individual possesses a certain degree of expertise or international recognition.

The important point, however, is that the impression created by a title does not necessarily correspond precisely to the individual’s actual authority, duties, institutional status, or representative capacity.

Accordingly, when an individual refers to a relationship with an international organization, it is important to objectively clarify matters such as:

Whether the individual is a formally appointed staff member;
Whether the individual represents a government or state;
Whether the individual was elected or formally selected to a position;
Whether the individual serves as an expert or committee member;
Whether the individual represents a private or civil society organization;
Whether the position is current or former; and
What specific duties and authority the individual actually possesses.

The objective is not to automatically praise or reject a title. Rather, it is to understand the precise nature of the title and then evaluate the individual’s statements and activities on an informed basis.

4.3 International Organizational Elections and the Formation of Personal Networks

International organizational elections and international conferences bring together representatives, government officials, specialists, and civil society participants from numerous countries and regions.

Such activities may involve diplomatic engagement, contact with government missions, participation in international conferences, introductions of candidates, exchanges of information, and the formation of personal networks.

These activities are, in themselves, normal and legitimate components of international engagement. However, personal networks developed through election campaigns and international conferences may subsequently become long-term social and professional assets.

Conceptually, this structure may be understood as follows:

International Conferences and International Activities

↓

Personal Contact and Information Exchange

↓

Formation of Mutual Trust

↓

Expansion of International Networks

↓

Acquisition of International Positions or Experience

↓

Greater Social Credibility and Communication Capacity

↓

Expanded Voice and Influence at Home and Abroad

In this manner, personal networks, professional experience, and institutional titles may interact to contribute to the formation of an individual’s social credibility.

4.4 From International Titles to Domestic Influence

A title associated with an international organization is, in principle, intended to describe a particular role, activity, or professional position within that organization.

Within domestic society, however, such a title may sometimes be interpreted more broadly than the individual’s actual institutional responsibilities and may contribute to increased public influence.

For example:

International Title or Experience

↓

Public Recognition of International Authority

↓

Media Appearances, Lectures, and Publications

↓

Information Dissemination through Social Media and Online Video Platforms

↓

Expansion of Personal Networks

↓

Policy Advocacy and Social Activities

↓

Engagement with Politicians, Government Institutions, and Other Organizations

Through such a process, international experience or institutional credentials may potentially be transformed into greater influence within domestic society.

This process does not, in itself, imply unlawful activity. In a democratic society, individuals with experience in international organizations or specialized fields are fully entitled to contribute to public and political debate on the basis of their knowledge and experience.

What is important is that society should not accept an individual’s statements as automatically correct solely because of a title or institutional affiliation.

The substance of the statements, the evidence supporting them, the policy positions involved, and the individual’s actual affiliation and authority should each be examined independently.

4.5 The Information Security Question of “Who Is Delivering the Message?”

In the contemporary information environment, the reception and credibility of information are influenced not only by what information is communicated, but also by who communicates it.

Even when the content of a message is identical, public perception and perceived credibility may differ significantly depending on whether the information is communicated by:

An anonymous social media user;
A university professor;
A former government official;
A former member of the Japan Self-Defense Forces or another security professional;
An individual associated with an international organization; or
A person holding an internationally recognized title.

Contemporary influence is therefore not determined solely by the content of information.

Conceptually, social or political influence may be formed through the interaction of multiple elements:

Content of Information

＋

Title or Institutional Status of the Messenger

＋

Social Credibility

＋

Personal Networks

＋

Media

＋

Social Media and Online Video Platforms

Here lies a contemporary information security challenge that differs from the traditional collection of state secrets or military intelligence.

4.6 The Need to Distinguish Titles from Actual Affiliation and Authority

From the perspective of national intelligence and information security, it is important to accurately verify an individual’s actual institutional affiliation, responsibilities, and authority when that individual or organization refers to a relationship with an international institution.

Descriptions such as “United Nations official” or “representative of an international organization” may not always provide sufficient information to accurately determine:

The individual’s formal institutional affiliation;
The nature of the individual’s duties;
The individual’s position within the organizational structure;
The individual’s actual authority;
The term or duration of the position; or
Whether the individual currently holds the position or held it in the past.

Accordingly, when a title associated with an international organization is used in political activities, social activities, or public information dissemination, it is important to clarify the precise nature of that title.

The purpose is not to unfairly suspect particular individuals. Rather, it is to prevent misunderstandings created by titles and to establish an environment in which citizens and policymakers can make informed decisions based on accurate information.

In a democratic society, neither unconditional trust in titles nor unjustified suspicion based solely on public information or allegations constitutes an appropriate approach.

What is required is calm and objective judgment based on accurate facts.

4.7 Influence Operations Are Not Limited to Professional Operatives

In contemporary information activities and the formation of influence, individuals or organizations that transmit information or affect public opinion are not necessarily acting as clearly identifiable intelligence operatives.

Businesses, research institutions, international organizations, political organizations, civil society groups, social media platforms, online video distribution channels, and ordinary citizens may all become channels through which information is transmitted.

Furthermore, when individuals disseminate or share particular information, such actions do not necessarily result from political intent or relationships with foreign actors.

Therefore, no individual should be identified as a foreign intelligence operative or as the perpetrator of unlawful activity solely on the basis of publicly available information or unverified suspicions.

The purpose of this analysis is not to characterize particular individuals.

Rather, it is to examine the structures through which individuals, personal networks, titles, social credibility, and information dissemination may become interconnected and contribute to the formation of social or political influence.

This perspective is important when considering information security in contemporary society.

4.8 The Formation of Social Credibility and Political Influence

In contemporary society, an individual’s public influence is not necessarily determined solely by actual expertise.

For example, social credibility or political influence may emerge through the interaction of:

Titles or affiliations indicating a relationship with international organizations;
Professional experience in the fields of security or other specialized areas;
Personal networks involving prominent individuals or experts;
Social media followers;
Information dissemination through YouTube and other online video platforms;
Lectures and publishing activities; and
Political activities and policy advocacy.

The important task is not to evaluate each of these elements in isolation, but to understand structurally how they interact and may be transformed into social influence.

International titles, personal networks, and professional experience are not inherently problematic.

What is necessary is an objective analysis of how such factors contribute to social credibility and how that credibility may subsequently be translated into information dissemination, social activities, and political influence.

4.9 “United Nations” Titles and Public Judgment in a Democratic Society

Titles associated with the United Nations and other international organizations may carry considerable social credibility in the eyes of the general public.

At the same time, a description such as “United Nations official” or “United Nations representative” may not always provide sufficient information to accurately determine an individual’s formal affiliation, duties, authority, or institutional position.

Accordingly, when titles associated with international organizations are used in political or social activities, it is important for voters and citizens to accurately understand their meaning in order to make informed judgments in a democratic society.

The issue is not the possession of an international title itself.

The important questions are:

What does the title actually mean?

What duties and authority does the individual actually possess?

Do the individual’s public statements correspond to the official position of the affiliated organization?

How is the title being used in political or social activities?

Society must consider these questions calmly and objectively.

From the perspective of information security, it is neither appropriate to characterize individuals solely on the basis of suspicion nor to place unconditional trust in titles or perceived authority.

The ability to objectively verify actual affiliations, institutional authority, personal networks, and the structures through which information is disseminated—and to make calm and informed judgments on the basis of those facts—is an essential foundation of information security in an age of information abundance.

Chapter 5

Contemporary Influence Operations and the Structure of Social Influence

5.1 Contemporary Influence Operations Extend Through Society

Contemporary information activities are not conducted solely by professional intelligence operatives.

Businesses, research institutions, political organizations, international organizations, civil society groups, social media users, and ordinary citizens may all become channels through which information is transmitted or social and political influence is formed.

However, individuals who participate in such channels must not be characterized as intelligence operatives without sufficient evidence.

What is important is to analyze who forms social credibility through particular personal networks, titles, financial resources, and channels of information dissemination, and how such credibility may subsequently be transformed into political or social influence.

5.2 The Structure of Individuals, Networks, Funding, and Information

In contemporary society, it is difficult to understand the full structure of influence by analyzing an individual in isolation.

The relevant structure may be understood as follows:

Individuals

↓

Personal Networks

↓

Financial Resources and Organizations

↓

Titles and Social Credibility

↓

Information Dissemination

↓

Social Media and Other Media

↓

Social Influence

From the perspective of national intelligence and information security, it is necessary to develop the capacity to analyze such structures lawfully and objectively.

5.3 The Social Credibility of Former Members of the Self-Defense Forces and Former Public Officials

The issue examined by the author is not limited to titles associated with the United Nations or other international organizations.

Social credibility may similarly be formed through other professional backgrounds, including those of former members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, former diplomats, former government officials, former police officers, university professors, and other individuals with socially recognized professional credentials.

For example, the following structure may emerge:

Previous Public Service or Professional Career

↓

Credibility as an Expert

↓

Media Appearances

↓

Social Media Communication

↓

Social Influence

The important point is not to view former public officials or former members of the Self-Defense Forces with suspicion.

Rather, it is necessary to distinguish between the social credibility derived from an individual’s past career and the individual’s current affiliation, activities, and information dissemination, and to evaluate each objectively.

5.4 Social Media, Online Video Platforms, and the Dissemination of Information

Social media and online video platforms have made it possible for individuals to acquire significant social influence.

At the same time, however, they have also created challenges, including:

Disinformation;
Misinformation;
Emotional polarization;
Social division;
Automated posting; and
Coordinated information dissemination.

In contemporary national security, it is necessary to analyze not only the content of information itself but also the channels through which information spreads and the social groups that may be influenced by it.

5.5 Information Manipulation in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

The development of artificial intelligence has expanded the potential risks associated with:

Fabricated images;
Manipulated or fabricated video;
Synthetic or fabricated audio;
Large-scale automated posting; and
Attempts to manipulate public opinion.

However, responding to these challenges through simplistic information control could threaten freedom of expression in a democratic society.

What is required is not the control of speech itself.

Rather, it is necessary to analyze the structures through which information is manipulated and to strengthen the ability of citizens to access and assess accurate information.

5.6 Social Division and National Security

Attention must be given not only to possible foreign influence operations but also to the potential amplification of divisions that already exist within domestic society.

If political, economic, regional, or generational conflicts become increasingly polarized, social fragmentation may affect a nation’s capacity for coherent decision-making.

National intelligence and information security should not be understood solely as a response to military threats originating from foreign countries.

Maintaining social stability, a healthy information environment, and the capacity of the state to make effective decisions are also important national security objectives.

Chapter 6

Proposals for Reforming Japan’s National Intelligence and Information Security System

6.1 Strengthening National Intelligence Integration and Analysis

The most important challenge in reforming Japan’s information security system is not simply to establish additional intelligence organizations.

Rather, Japan must strengthen its capacity to integrate and analyze information at the national level while preserving the specialized expertise of organizations responsible for such fields as law enforcement, defense, diplomacy, economic security, and cybersecurity.

The basic structure should be developed as follows:

Specialized Organizations

↓

Necessary Information Sharing

↓

Integrated Analysis

↓

National Security Assessment

↓

Policy Decision-Making

However, the integration of information must not result in an unlimited concentration of governmental authority. A clear legal framework is necessary to protect personal information, the secrecy of communications, freedom of expression, and other fundamental human rights.

6.2 Establishing a Long-Term Specialist Career System

Within the field of national intelligence and information security, there are areas in which frequent personnel rotations and short-term assignments may not be sufficient to develop the necessary level of expertise.

Such areas include:

China studies;
Russia studies;
Middle East studies;
Cybersecurity;
Artificial intelligence analysis;
Economic security; and
The analysis of influence operations.

These fields require the accumulation of long-term knowledge and practical experience.

Accordingly, Japan should consider establishing a system that allows specialists in designated fields to develop and retain their expertise over extended periods.

6.3 Information Analysis Capabilities of Politicians and Political Parties

One issue that the author considers particularly important is the capacity of politicians and political parties themselves to analyze information.

In a democratic state, ultimate decisions concerning national policy are made through the political process.

However, if politicians depend excessively on:

Reports provided by government officials;
Official government announcements;
News media coverage; and
Information circulating on social media,

their ability to exercise independent political judgment may be weakened.

It is therefore important for political parties and politicians, within the limits of the law, to have access to professional policy and analytical advisers capable of gathering and assessing policy-relevant information, evaluating expert opinions, and examining national policy from perspectives that differ from those of government administrative organizations.

6.4 Institutionalizing Public–Private Information Cooperation

Much of the critical technology and information relevant to contemporary national security exists within private companies and research institutions.

It has therefore become increasingly difficult to consider national security solely within the framework of government institutions.

Appropriate cooperation is required with:

Private companies;
Universities;
Research institutions;
Cybersecurity specialists; and
Technical experts.

At the same time, excessive government surveillance of private society would be inappropriate.

The objective should not be for the state to control private institutions, but rather to establish a system through which information genuinely necessary for national security can be shared lawfully, appropriately, and within clearly defined limits.

6.5 Strengthening Information Analysis in the Age of Social Media and Artificial Intelligence

In contemporary society, a single piece of false information may spread to large audiences within a very short period of time.

The development of artificial intelligence has also created a need to address information manipulation involving fabricated images, manipulated videos, and synthetic audio.

Accordingly, Japan should strengthen its capacity to conduct:

Analysis of information manipulation;
Analysis of channels and patterns of information dissemination;
Identification and assessment of AI-generated information;
Analysis of social polarization and division; and
Public–private cooperation.

Such capabilities are increasingly necessary in order to understand and respond to the contemporary information environment.

6.6 Democratic Oversight and the Protection of Human Rights

Strengthening national intelligence capabilities must not mean the unlimited expansion of state power.

On the contrary, the greater the authority granted to intelligence and information security organizations, the more clearly democratic mechanisms of oversight and accountability must be established.

These mechanisms should include:

Clear legal authority;
Parliamentary oversight;
Judicial review and control;
Administrative inspection and accountability mechanisms;
Protection of personal information; and
Accessible systems for complaints and appeals.

National security and individual freedom are not inherently opposing concepts.

Through appropriate institutional design, it is essential to establish a system in which national security and democratic principles can coexist and reinforce one another.

Chapter 7:

Foreign Resident Policy, Social Integration, and National Security

7-1. Foreign Resident Issues Should Not Be Treated as a Single Administrative Problem

Issues concerning foreign residents involve numerous areas of public administration, including:

Economic security
Foreign affairs
National security

and many other administrative fields.

If each of these issues continues to be handled solely and separately by individual administrative organizations, it may become difficult for the nation as a whole to understand the broader picture.

7-2. Establishment of a Cross-Ministerial “Foreign Resident Policy Team”

The author has proposed the establishment of a cross-ministerial Foreign Resident Policy Team.

The purpose of such an organization is not to monitor or exclude foreign residents indiscriminately. Rather, its purpose would be to analyze, across institutional boundaries, multiple and interconnected issues relating to:

Public Administration

↓

Public Security

↓

Social Integration

↓

Economic Affairs

↓

National Security

Such a system would require appropriate safeguards, including:

A clear legal basis
Clearly defined limitations on the purpose for which information may be used
Protection of personal information
Independent oversight
Procedures for appeals and complaints

7-3. Consideration of an Objective Evaluation and Point-Based System

The author has proposed consideration of an evaluation system for foreign resident policy based on objective administrative facts.

A fundamental principle must be that nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, and political beliefs must not be used as criteria for evaluation.

At the same time, consideration may be given, under appropriate legal procedures, to objective factors such as:

Lawful residence status
Compliance with laws and regulations
Fulfillment of public obligations, including the payment of taxes
The existence of false or fraudulent applications
Abuse or fraudulent use of administrative systems

The purpose of such a system is not exclusion.

Rather, its purpose should be to fairly recognize individuals who participate lawfully and stably in Japanese society and fulfill their obligations, while responding appropriately to serious unlawful conduct and the abuse of public systems.

7-4. Clearly Distinguishing Public Security from National Defense

When considering foreign resident policy and national security, public security and national defense must not be confused.

Public security primarily concerns the prevention of crime and the maintenance of public order within the country.

National defense and national security, by contrast, concern military threats from foreign states, espionage activities, cyberattacks, and other threats affecting the survival and security of the nation.

The two areas are interconnected. However, their respective missions and legal authorities must remain clearly distinguished.

The objective should neither be to transform the police into a national defense organization nor to assign the Self-Defense Forces responsibility for ordinary domestic law enforcement.

What is required is a system that enables the lawful sharing of necessary information while preserving the distinct institutional roles of each organization.

7-5. Social Integration and National Security

An important objective of foreign resident policy should not be simple exclusion.

To maintain social stability, it is also important to create an environment in which individuals who reside lawfully and participate in society can live with security and confidence.

Rather than treating national security and social integration as opposing concepts, they should be considered comprehensively through the framework of:

Compliance with Laws and Regulations

＋

Social Integration

＋

Appropriate Administrative Management

＋

Maintenance of Public Security

＋

National Security

Conclusion

The press conference held at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on August 27, 2026, concerning Japan’s intelligence and security framework once again brought public attention to the challenges facing Japan’s intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities.

However, it would be insufficient to assume that Japan’s problems could be resolved simply by enacting an anti-espionage law.

As the comparative analysis in this report demonstrates, the more fundamental problem is:

The fragmentation of organizations that possess important information and the insufficient development of a national capacity to integrate and analyze such information.

Moreover, contemporary intelligence and influence operations cannot be understood solely by focusing on traditional professional intelligence officers or agents.

In modern society, information and influence may potentially be developed and transmitted through diverse channels, including:

Personal Networks

Titles and Positions

Social Credibility

Financial Resources

International Organizations

Elections and Appointments within the United Nations and Other International Institutions

Social Media

Video Platforms

Artificial Intelligence

International Networks

For this reason, what is needed is not the indiscriminate labeling of individuals as foreign agents.

What is required is the capacity to analyze how information is transmitted through society and how it may be transformed into social and political influence.

The same principle applies to the United Nations and other international organizations.

International activities and international cooperation are important to Japan.

The issue is not an individual’s relationship with an international organization itself. Rather, it is necessary to understand accurately the person’s title, affiliation, authority, and representative status and to analyze objectively how social credibility may be transformed into influence both domestically and internationally.

The national intelligence and security system that Japan should develop in the future should simultaneously advance the following objectives:

Strengthening intelligence collection capabilities
Integrating information held by relevant organizations
Accumulating analytical expertise through long-term specialist career systems
Strengthening the policy analysis capabilities of politicians and political parties
Institutionalizing appropriate public-private information cooperation
Developing capabilities to analyze influence operations in the age of AI and social media
Analyzing the structures of influence created through elections, appointments, and titles associated with the United Nations and other international organizations
Conducting cross-ministerial analysis of foreign resident policy
Considering objective evaluation systems based on lawful and administratively verifiable facts
Clearly distinguishing the institutional roles of public security and national defense
Ensuring human rights protections and democratic oversight

What Japan needs is not merely a narrow approach to “countering espionage.”

It requires the establishment of a new national intelligence and security system that integrates intelligence collection, integrated analysis, counterintelligence, economic security, cybersecurity, responses to social influence operations, analysis of international networks, and democratic oversight.

Policy Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Strengthen the National Capacity for Integrated Intelligence Analysis

Information held by relevant organizations should be shared, within the scope permitted by law and when necessary, in order to strengthen a central function capable of conducting cross-sectoral analysis of threats to national security.

Recommendation 2: Clearly Distinguish Public Security from National Defense

The legal foundations and institutional responsibilities of public security and national defense should be clearly defined while establishing mechanisms for the necessary exchange of information.

Recommendation 3: Institutionalize a Cross-Ministerial Foreign Resident Policy Team

A cross-ministerial organization should be established to comprehensively analyze administrative, public security, and national security issues relating to foreign resident policy across multiple government ministries and local administrative bodies.

Recommendation 4: Consider an Objective Evaluation and Point-Based System

An evaluation system should be considered based not on nationality or ethnicity but on compliance with laws and regulations and other objectively verifiable administrative facts.

Recommendation 5: Develop Long-Term Country and Regional Specialists

Specialists in foreign languages, regional studies, intelligence analysis, cybersecurity, and related fields should be developed over the long term in order to prevent the loss of accumulated expertise through frequent personnel rotations.

Recommendation 6: Strengthen Information Analysis Capabilities in the Age of Social Media and AI

Japan should strengthen its ability to analyze disinformation, information manipulation, and social polarization.

However, freedom of expression and legitimate criticism of the government must not themselves become objects of inappropriate surveillance.

Recommendation 7: Institutionalize Public-Private Cooperation

Japan should strengthen its national security information analysis capabilities by utilizing the expertise of private companies, universities, and research institutions under appropriate legal safeguards and democratic oversight.

Recommendation 8: Establish a Parliamentary Intelligence and Information Caucus

Because individual members of parliament face inherent limitations in their ability to collect and analyze information independently, a bipartisan Parliamentary Intelligence and Information Caucus should be established.

The caucus would provide a framework for members of parliament to share and analyze information relating to domestic and international developments. It should also cooperate with researchers and private-sector experts in order to develop policy recommendations concerning national security and other important policy issues.

Its purpose would be to strengthen the ability of political leaders themselves to gather and analyze information from multiple perspectives and thereby improve the quality of policy decision-making.

Overall Assessment

The question raised by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan press conference— “Is Japan a paradise for spies?”—is only the starting point.

The more fundamental question is:

Can Japan develop the national intelligence capabilities necessary to respond to the complex information warfare, technological competition, cyberspace threats, international influence-building, and social influence operations of the twenty-first century?

To achieve this objective, simply creating one additional organization will not be sufficient.

What is required is a new national intelligence strategy capable of lawfully integrating information held throughout the state, analyzing it professionally, connecting it to political decision-making, and at the same time ensuring that such authority remains subject to democracy and the rule of law.

The intelligence and security system that Japan should pursue is not one based on the unlimited expansion of state power.

It should be a system designed to:

“Integrate accurate information, objectively analyze threats, and protect national sovereignty, public safety, and individual freedom through due legal process and democratic oversight.”

In the age of information warfare in the twenty-first century, Japan requires national security reform that is not constrained by outdated institutional structures or narrow bureaucratic interests.

Taking the issues raised at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan as its starting point, Japan must now shift its thinking from the question of “who possesses information” to the more fundamental question of “how Japan, as a nation, can integrate and analyze information in order to protect its national interests and its people.”

This is the central policy recommendation of this report.

Afterword

We live in an age of information overload. Within this vast flow of information, valuable and unreliable material coexist, while truth and falsehood are often intricately intertwined. In an increasingly stressful society shaped by excessive amounts of information, people are frequently placed in situations where they cannot easily determine whether what they encounter is factual, false, misleading, or even fraudulent.

When false or inaccurate information is disseminated, individuals who suffer harm may be required to devote considerable time and effort to seeking its removal. At the same time, it is difficult to conclude that sufficient public discussion has taken place regarding the appropriate legal regulation of profit-oriented platform operators that benefit from the dissemination of information, or regarding the extent of their responsibility for the harm that such information may cause.

There are also cases in which individuals associated with international organizations make political statements concerning Japan’s Imperial system or the Imperial Household Law. Such statements may, in some circumstances, be regarded as expressions of opinion protected by freedom of expression. At the same time, attempts by actors outside Japan to exert political influence over the country’s national institutions and traditions require careful consideration, including from the perspective of possible interference in domestic affairs.

If a bipartisan Parliamentary Intelligence and Information Caucus were to be established, it could provide a framework for collecting and analyzing relevant information on such issues and, where necessary, considering appropriate responses through the National Diet and other relevant institutions.

In recent years, some individuals have also used titles associated with international organizations or their own public prominence to engage in political activities, while others have expanded their political influence through video-sharing platforms such as YouTube. This report does not seek to deny the legitimacy of political expression or public communication itself. However, there are cases in which criticism and problem-raising take precedence without being accompanied by sufficiently concrete and realistic policy proposals.

Furthermore, on social media, multiple anonymous accounts may sometimes be used to disseminate particular information. By concentrating attention through platform algorithms or generating so-called online “flame wars,” large volumes of information can spread rapidly within a short period of time. In such an environment, disinformation, misinformation, inflammatory expressions, and one-sided claims may be accepted without adequate verification.

What will be required in the future information society is not merely the regulation of information itself. Each member of the public must also develop the ability to examine calmly and critically the position and objectives of the source, the origin of the information, the evidence supporting it, and the background against which it is disseminated.

To achieve this, it is also important to establish mechanisms that provide viewers and readers with the knowledge and methods necessary to examine information from multiple perspectives—in other words, to provide practical tools and knowledge for understanding and critically evaluating information.

Precisely because we live in an age of information overload, what is required of us is not simply the collection of more information. Rather, society as a whole must cultivate the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, to avoid being overwhelmed or manipulated by information, and to think and make judgments independently.

The reform of the national intelligence system proposed in this report, the establishment of a Parliamentary Intelligence and Information Caucus, improved information-sharing among administrative institutions, and the enhancement of public information literacy are not separate and unrelated challenges.

The ability of the state to analyze information appropriately and the ability of citizens to assess information calmly and independently. Strengthening both capabilities is the essential foundation of Japan’s information security in the years ahead.

Author Profile

Kenshin Kinoshita is the Director of the Middle East and Asia Strategic Information Institute.

His research focuses primarily on politics, security, and information strategy in the Middle East and Asia. He conducts analyses of international affairs and develops research and policy recommendations intended to contribute to Japan’s policy decision-making.

The Middle East and Asia Strategic Information Institute is an independent think tank that analyzes political, security, economic, and information-strategy developments in the Middle East and Asia and develops policy recommendations intended to contribute to Japan’s policy-making and institutional design.

日本の情報安全保障体制の脆弱性と改革に関する比較分析

Japan’s Intelligence and Information Security Vulnerabilities: A Comparative Analysis and Reform Agenda